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This dissertation includes two chapters on topics related to market microstruc-
ture and high frequency trading.
In the first chapter, I explore the effects of speed differences among front-
running high frequency traders (HFTs) in a model of one round of trading. Traders
differ in speed and their speed differences matter. I model strategic interactions
induced when HFTs have different speeds in an extended Kyle (1985) framework.
HFTs are assumed to anticipate incoming orders and trade rapidly to exploit normal-
speed traders’ latencies. Upon observing a common noisy signal about the incoming
order flow, faster HFTs react more quickly than slower HFTs. I find that these
front-running HFTs effectively levy a tax on normal-speed traders, making markets
less liquid and prices ultimately less informative. Such negative effects on market
quality are more severe when HFTs have more heterogeneous speeds. Even when
infinitely many HFTs compete, their negative effects in general do not vanish. I
analyze policy proposals concerning HFTs and find that (1) lowering the frequency of
trading reduces the negative impact of HFTs on market quality and (2) randomizing
the sequence of order execution can degrade market quality when the randomizing
interval is short. Consistent with empirical findings, a small number of HFTs can
generate a large fraction of the trading volume and HFTs’ profits depend on their
speeds relative to other HFTs.
In the second chapter, I study the effects of higher trading frequency and
front-running in a dynamic model. I find that a higher trading frequency improves
the informativeness of prices and increases the trading losses of liquidity driven noise
traders. When the trading frequency is finite, the existence of HFT front-runners
hampers price efficiency and market liquidity. In the limit when trading frequency is
infinitely high, however, information efficiency is unaffected by front-running HFTs
and these HFTs make all profits from noise traders who do not smooth out their
trades.
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Chapter 1: High Frequency Trading with Speed Hierarchies
1.1 Introduction
High frequency trading (HFT) has emerged as a prominent feature of today’s
financial markets. Empirical studies find that high frequency traders (HFTs) have
high trading volume, very short holding horizons, and invest astonishing amounts of
capital to be slightly faster.1 Consistent with these stylized facts, I model the front-
running HFTs who anticipate incoming orders, trade rapidly, and have short holding
horizons. In contrast to existing models of front-running, such as Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2005) and Carlin, Lobo and Viswanathan (2007), I allow HFTs to have
different speeds to examine the impact of speed competition. Speed differences among
HFTs affect all traders: (1) profits of a high frequency trader depend on her speed
relative to other HFTs and (2) the aggregate profits of all HFTs, effectively a “speed
tax” levied on other traders, depend on the distribution of HFTs’ relative speeds. The
presence of HFTs makes markets less liquid and prices ultimately less informative.
Such negative effects are more severe when HFTs have more heterogeneous speeds.2
1 See Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2011) and Laughlin, Aguirre and Grundfest (2013).
2 This paper focuses on the front-running HFTs who trade mainly with market orders. Other
types of HFT strategies could have different impact on market quality.
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I introduce fast traders into an extended Kyle (1985) framework with trading
and quoting latencies. There are three types of “normal-speed” traders: (i) a strategic
informed trader who privately observes the true value of a risky asset, (ii) noise
traders who trade randomly for non-informational motives, and (iii) a continuum of
competitive market makers who passively absorb order flow imbalance. Normal-speed
traders’ actions suffer from short latencies and fast traders exploit these latencies
with their speed advantage.
Specifically, at the beginning of a trading round, competitive market makers
post a linear pricing function that others can trade against. The slope of the pricing
function is fixed during the trading round because market makers are not fast enough.
After observing the pricing function, the informed and noise traders submit market
orders. Before the orders arrive in the market, fast traders observe a common noisy
signal about the orders and rapidly front-run by trading in the same direction at
better prices ahead of the orders. When the informed and noise traders’ orders arrive
slightly later, fast traders reverse their early trades and exit their positions at profits.
At the end of the trading round, competitive market makers update the final quoted
price.
Fast traders effectively levy a speed tax and the tax makes the market less
liquid for both the informed and noise traders. Because market makers cannot adjust
the pricing function instantaneously, they suffer additional losses trading with fast
traders. To make up for the additional losses, market makers increase the slope of
the pricing schedule to charge more for absorbing order flow imbalance. Because
trading is anonymous, market makers have to set a steeper pricing schedule for all
2
other traders. Effectively, fast traders levy a speed tax on market makers and market
makers shift the tax burden to the informed and noise traders by making liquidity
more costly. Hence the informed trader profits less on given private information and
noise traders lose more to trade the same amount.
Speed differences lead to short-term price momentum and reversals in a trad-
ing round. Prices exhibit short-term momentum when front-running fast traders
sequentially “pick off” the stale pricing schedule to establish positions. The informed
and noise traders’ orders arrive slightly later and the orders are executed at worse
prices due to the steeper pricing schedule. At the end of the trading round, knowing
that prices have overshot, market makers partially reverse the final quoted price back
to the informationally efficient level.
Prices are ultimately less informative when front-running fast traders are
present. In the brief time before the informed and noise traders’ orders arrive, fast
traders’ front-running trades bring information to the market and the intermediate
prices are more informative. Information value of the intermediate prices, however,
is quickly superseded by the more informative orders from the informed and noise
traders. Ultimately, price informativeness is determined by the fraction of informed
trader’s orders in the aggregate order flow. Because the informed trader lowers trading
intensity in response to higher liquidity costs, the aggregate order flow becomes less
informative. This makes prices ultimately less informative after normal-speed traders
have traded and fast traders have exited their positions.
A fast trader’s effect on the informativeness of the order flow is similar to
a prying messenger’s effect on the information content of a letter. Suppose right
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before delivering a letter, a messenger glances at it and summarizes the letter
to the receiver. Although the summary is informative, its information value is
supplanted momentarily by the letter itself. Furthermore, expecting the letter to
be pried into, the sender is less likely to write clearly and ultimately the receiver is
less informed. The informed and noise traders share the direct cost of paying the
speed tax; indirectly, decision makers who rely on price signals also suffer from less
informative prices.
The negative impact of fast traders on market quality is more severe when
they make more profits. Fast traders’ aggregate profits in turn depend on the
distribution of their relative speeds. I prove that for a given number of fast traders,
their aggregate profits are minimized if every fast trader has the same speed and their
aggregate profits are maximized if every fast trader has a different speed. Similarly,
the entry of a fast trader could improve or degrade market quality depending on the
entrant’s speed relative to existing fast traders. If the entrant has the same speed
as an existing fast trader, the aggregate fast trading profits decline. If the entrant
has a different speed from all existing fast traders, the aggregate fast trading profits
increase.
Intuitively, fast traders with the same speed compete against one another on
quantity in a Cournot competition. In the limit when infinitely many fast traders
compete on quantity, their aggregate profits converge to zero because they collectively
push their entry price to equal their exit price. On the other hand, when more
fast traders with different speeds are present, they collectively have more trading
opportunities, march along the price schedule more gradually, and extract higher
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profits from market makers’ stale pricing function. Intuitively, their aggregate profits
are higher in this model because the “combined” trading frequency of all fast traders
is higher than the trading frequency of any individual fast trader. In the limit when
infinitely many fast traders with different speeds compete, the fastest front-runners
still make positive profits and the slowest front-runners’ profits converge to zero.
Market quality tends to settle on the suboptimal case in which fast traders have
different speeds. First, fast traders have strong incentives to break away from a same-
speed scenario. A higher speed leads to two-fold advantages for faster front-runners:
they are able to establish larger positions at better prices than slower ones. In this
model, a fast trader could quadruple the expected trading profits by moving up one
spot in the ranking of relative speeds among fast traders. Second, the increasingly
finer time granularity of modern markets opens up more space for fast traders to
differ on speed. In a continuously operating market, no one could ever attain zero
latency and traders can always beat competitors by any slight speed advantage. If
fast traders engage in “arms race” in speed, they are unlikely to have the same speed
and increased competition among fast traders may not improve market quality.
The model sheds light on several policy proposals concerning HFTs. (1)
Lowering the entry cost to become HFTs may not improve market quality significantly
if it does not reduce the heterogeneity of relative speeds among HFTs. (2) Converting
a continuous market to a market with periodic uniform price auctions reduces the
negative impact of front-running by enforcing Cournot competition among HFTs.
(3) Randomizing the sequence of order execution is far less effective than the periodic
uniform price auction. When the interval of randomizing is short, it can even
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degrade market quality. Intuitively, while randomizing reduces profits of the fastest
HFT, it could help some slower HFTs; the net effect depends on the number of
HFTs pooled in the same randomizing interval. (4) Requiring quotes to stay for a
minimum duration or charging a fee for quote updating might aggravate the impact
of front-running. Such rules could make the order flow easier to predict and extend
the durations of profitable front-running.
My model also generate many empirical predictions. (1) In a continuous market,
if front-runners trade on the same signal, only a few can survive; the markets for
front-runners saturates quickly. (2) Entry of a fastest front-running HFT reduces
the volume and profits of all existing front-running HFTs. It does not affect market
quality significantly when the existing market for front-runners is almost saturated.
(3) When front-running HFTs predict the order flow more accurately or when their
relative speeds become more heterogeneous, their impact becomes more severe. Short-
term price volatilities increase, short-term price momentum and reversal become
stronger, normal-speed traders initiate less trading volume, and front-running HFTs’
profits become a larger fraction of noise traders’ implementation shortfall. (4) Faster
front-running HFTs tend to trade more shares, have higher inventory levels, hold
inventory for longer durations, and make more profit per share because they establish
larger positions earlier at better entry prices.
1.1.1 Related literature
Angel, Harris and Spatt (2011) and Litzenberger, Castura and Gorelick (2012)
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recently survey literature related to HFT and modernization of the financial market.
This paper focuses on the impact of speed differences on the competition among
front-running fast traders. Assuming predatory front-runners have the same speed,
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) find that “predation is most fierce if there are
few predators”. I show that when front-runners have different speeds, the impact
of “predation” does not vanish even when infinitely many front-runners compete
and their impact can be more severe when more front-runners are present. Hence,
increasing the trading frequency tends to weaken the price or quantity competition
and encourage socially wasteful speed competition among front-runners.
Many existing papers also assume that fast traders have homogeneous speeds
and thus are not suitable to explore the implications of speed differences among
fast traders. For instance, some studies, such as Pagano and Röell (1993), Brunner-
meier (2005), Bernhardt and Taub (2008), Cohen and Szpruch (2012), and Foucault,
Hombert and Rosu (2012), consider the situation with one monopolistic fast trader;
others, such as Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1994), Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2005), Carlin et al. (2007), Jarrow and Protter (2012), Hoffmann (2012),
and Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2013), assume that fast traders have the same
deterministic speed. Recently Budish, Cramton and Shim (2013) model high fre-
quency market makers with the same speed in probability. In their model, when
a high frequency market maker’s quote of one share becomes stale, it is randomly
“sniped” by another market maker. This leads to a positive bid-ask spread without
information asymmetry or risk aversion. They also advocate using periodic batch
auctions to eliminate this inefficiency. Penalva and Cartea (2012) discuss the situa-
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tion when each HFT randomly intercepts a profitable trade according to her skill
level. Essentially in their model multiple HFTs have the same speed but different
market shares. Martinez and Rosu (2013) discuss one case in which two groups of
HFTs have different speeds. HFTs in their model behave very differently because
they are faster and more informed.
Unlike in Goldman and Sosin (1979), Hirshleifer et al. (1994) and Martinez
and Rosu (2013), HFTs in my paper are faster than the informed trader but the
informed trader has better information about the fundamentals. This assumption
reflects the underlying costs of information production. Information processing takes
time. So traders face the trade-off between information accuracy and trading speed.
This trade-off is not reflected in existing models in which some traders are both
faster and (weakly) more informed than all others. By contrast, in my paper fast
traders start trading earlier on a less accurate signal while the informed trader trades
later on a more accurate signal.
In addition, fast traders in this paper focus on information about incoming order
flow not the fundamental value. In the short-term, the resale value of a risky security
is more likely driven by the order flow rather than the fundamental value. Hence,
consistent with the insight of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992), fast traders with
limited holding horizons and limited resource should focus on producing information
about the short-term order flow and tend to become less informed about long-term
fundamentals. Consequently, in contrast to Martinez and Rosu (2013), in this paper
the presence of fast traders reduces overall price informativeness ex post because it is
an impediment to the slower but better informed trader. In Brunnermeier (2005), a
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short-run trader has noisy information about an incoming public news release. This
trader trades less when his signal is less informative about the fundamentals. In my
model, HFTs trade the same even when the fraction of informed trading volume is
low because HFTs make the same profits no matter whom they front-run.
In this paper, fast traders are partially informed because of their information
on the order flow. They differ from an informed trader in existing models in two
respects: (1) fast traders have higher speeds and shorter holding horizons than
the better informed trader, and (2) fast traders have no source of information that
is independent from slow traders’ order flow. Such features imply that the more
informed yet slower trader cannot avoid being front-run and she does not need to
speed up to avoid information decay: fast traders cannot learn her information
if the informed trader does not trade. Therefore, unlike in existing models with
multiple informed traders such as Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and
Viswanathan (1996), Vayanos (1999), Back, Cao and Willard (2000), Bernhardt and
Miao (2004), and Li (2013), in this paper, the better informed trader always reduces
her trading intensity in the presence of less informed fast traders and prices become
less informative.
Some theoretical papers focus on other aspects of HFTs and algorithmic trading.
Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) model HFTs as a machine which immediately “snipes”
out a human order when its price deviates too far from a benchmark level. Gerig and
Michayluk (2010) model HFTs as automatic market makers who use the relationships
between multiple securities to price order flow in an extension of the Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) model. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2012) model HFTs as competitive
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intermediaries who can process hard information. Pagnotta and Philippon (2012) use
a search model to investigate the exchanges’ incentives to lower latencies. Yueshen
(2013) models the strategic interactions among limit order traders when they cannot
condition orders on positions in the queue. Weller (2013) develops a model in
which fast market makers specialize in immediacy provision and slow market makers
specialize in risk bearing.
My model is consistent with many empirical characteristics of HFTs. My model
predicts that only a few HFTs can survive in the market. Many empirical studies
identify only a very small number HFTs. My model predicts that when there are
already a handful of HFTs, the entry of new HFTs does not affect the aggregate
HFT trading profits significantly. Budish et al. (2013) find that the profitability
of HFTs’ trading opportunities remains almost constant over the years 2005-2011
despite the fierce competition among HFTs. HFTs in this paper are front-runners.
Hirschey (2013) finds that HFTs have the ability to anticipate non-HFTs’ large trades.
Clark-Joseph (2013) finds that aggressive HFTs use smallest orders to explore market
conditions and choose the timing to front-run large incoming demands. In my model
HFTs mainly use market orders. Studies using individual account data, such as
Baron, Brogaard and Kirilenko (2012), Breckenfelder (2013), Brogaard, Hagströmer,
Norden and Riordan (2013a), and Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) all find that some
HFTs predominantly trade with market orders and they tend to make more profits
than other HFTs.
My model predicts that HFTs’ trades are informative and improve short-term
intermediate price informativeness. Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2013b) find
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that the marketable orders of HFT have high predictive power about future price
changes in less than 5 seconds. Brogaard et al. (2013a) find that co-located traders
have an informational advantage. Zhang (2012) finds that HFTs profit on “hard”
information and their profits realize quickly. Carrion (2013) also finds HFTs have
intra-day market timing capability. My model also predicts that front-running HFTs
can reduce information efficiency in the long run. Differentiating the two information
efficiencies poses new empirical challenges.
In this paper, front-running HFTs increase short-term volatility and reduce
long-term volatility. Breckenfelder (2013) finds that HFTs increase intra-day volatility
but not inter-daily volatility. Jiang, Lo and Valente (2013) and Boehmer, Fong
and Wu (2012) find that HFT or algorithmic trading tend to increase short-term
volatility.
In this model, HFTs follow similar strategies and their profits depend on their
relative speeds. Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson and Vega (2013) find algorithmic
traders tend to use correlated strategies. Gai, Yao and Ye (2012) and Egginton,
Van Ness and Van Ness (2013) find evidence that some traders use the “quote-stuffing”
strategy to slow down other traders.
My model predicts that although their trading volume is high, front-running
HFTs reduce market liquidity. Hendershott and Moulton (2011) find that automation
increases bid-ask spreads. Tong (2013) finds that HFTs increase the trading costs of
institutional traders. Many empirical studies find that algorithmic trading or high
frequency trading improve liquidity. This could be due to three main reasons. First,
some studies, such as Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld
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(2011), Hendershott and Riordan (2012), Menkveld (2013), investigate either all
algorithmic traders or market making HFTs. Isolating the effects of front-running
HFTs and assessing their relative importance are open empirical questions. Second,
traditional measures could underestimate illiquidity in the presence of front-running
HFTs. For example, bid-ask spreads and depth of the limit order book may not
capture market liquidity when HFTs can quickly cancel limit orders. In addition, a
large order would move the price before it arrives in the market when front-runners
are present. Third, liquidity might be improved because of other contemporaneous
factors.
1.2 Benchmark model of a monopolistic fast trader
I introduce delays in trading and quoting into the static model of Kyle (1985)
and add a new type of trader fast enough to exploit the short delays. The section
presents the benchmark model with only one fast trader.
1.2.1 Model setup
Assets and Traders Traders trade two assets: a risk free numeraire asset
with zero interest rate and a risky asset with normally distributed fundamental
value v ∼ N (v0, σ2v). All traders are risk neutral.3 As in Kyle (1985), three types of
traders have normal speeds: (1) a strategic monopolistic informed trader privately
observes the true value v of the risky asset; (2) noise traders randomly trade normally
3 In Appendix A.1.4, I discuss the implication of fast traders’ risk aversion.
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distributed z ∼ N (0, σ2z) shares for exogenous non-informational motives;4 and (3)
competitive fringe market makers set the pricing functions, absorb the residual order
flow imbalances, and make zero expected profit.5
I introduce a new type of traders: the fast traders who anticipate the size of
the incoming market orders and rapidly trade twice in one trading round. Unlike
normal-speed traders, fast traders do not carry inventory when the trading round
ends. In the benchmark model, only one fast trader is present. In the general model
of Section 1.3, multiple strategic fast traders with possibly different speeds compete
with one another.6
Timeline and Information Structure The paper presents models of one
trading round. Figure 1.1 illustrates the timeline of the benchmark model. At
4 Although noise traders on average lose in trading, they are not necessarily irrational. For
example, they could have idiosyncratic liquidity demands unrelated to the valuation of the risky
asset.
5 Following the literature, I name a continuum of competitive fringe traders market makers. They
do not, however, act like specialists or designated market makers in a dealer market. These market
makers represent the large population of traders who have no information or speed advantage, and
also no incentives to initiate trades.
6 Empirical studies such as Baron et al. (2012) and Breckenfelder (2013) have documented a large
heterogeneity among HFTs in terms of order aggressiveness, i.e., the ratio of market versus limit
orders. In this paper fast traders could be interpreted as the front-running HFTs who predominantly
trade with market orders and reap the largest trading profits among all HFTs. As pointed out by
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), however, the difference between limit orders and market orders is not
necessarily crucial. In practice, front-running strategies could be implemented with a mixture of
market orders and limit orders.
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time 0, the trading round starts. Market makers set a publicly observable pricing
function P (·, ·). An order of yt shares arrives at time t ∈ (0, 1] and is filled by the
market makers at the average price of pt = P (yt,Ft). Ft denotes market makers’
information by time t. To model market makers’ latency, the pricing function P (·, ·)
is fixed in time interval (0, 1+).
At time 0+ after observing the pricing function P (·, ·) the informed trader
submits a market order of x shares and noise traders submit a market order of z
shares. Their orders suffer from a short latency and will not arrive in the market
until time 1. Since the market is continuously operating, trades and quote updates
may take place between time 0+ and time 1. The delay is so short that no one other
than the fast trader could exploit it.
Right after time 0+ the fast trader observes a private signal Iy = y + ey
about the incoming order flow y = x+ z where ey ∼ N (0, σ2e) denotes the normally
distributed observation error. The quality of the signal Iy is represented by ρ, the
squared correlation between Iy and y, i.e.,
ρ ≡ Corr2(y, Iy) ∈ (0, 1] (1.2.1)
I take information quality ρ as exogenously given.7 A more informative signal Iy
has a higher ρ. If Iy reveals y precisely, ρ = 1; if Iy is almost all noise, ρ→ 0. The
projection theorem for normal random variables implies that ŷ ≡ E[y|Iy] = ρ · Iy.
At time 1−, based on her signal Iy the fast trader trades u shares. Market








. For example, if it
is know that the informed trader almost does not trade (σ2x → 0), the observation error is almost
entirely about noise trading size z.
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makers fill the order at the price of p1− = P (u,F1−).
At time 1, the informed trader’s order x and the noise traders’ order z arrive
in the market. At the same time, the fast trader submits a order of −u shares to
liquidate her position because she is not allowed to carry inventory when the trading
round ends.8 Trades are all anonymous and market makers fill all orders at the same
price of p1 = P (x+ z − u,F1).
Finally, at time 1+, right after time 1, market makers look back at the order
flow history of the trading round and update the final quoted price to be p1+ . The
trading round ends.
At time 0, it is common knowledge that value of the risky asset v, noise traders’
order size z, and the fast trader’s observation error ey are mutually independent.
1.2.2 Discussion on speed
In many models of strategic trading, such as Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992),
Foster and Viswanathan (1996), and Vayanos (1999), all traders move at the same
frequency: they act once per round. The defining feature of high frequency traders,
however, is not that they are fast but that they are faster than others. In this paper,
the fast trader has speed advantage over all other traders in various ways.
First, while the fast trader is able to trade twice without latencies in one
trading round, the informed and noise traders can only trade once. Moreover, they
8 The fast trader trade the −u shares with market orders. In practice, the fast trader might try
to trade the −u shares with limit orders to reduce transaction costs.
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t = 0 t = 1− t = 1 t = 1+
+ + + +
Time
Pricing function










p1 p1+ = E[v|F1]
Figure 1.1: Timeline of the benchmark model of a monopoly fast trader.At time 0,
market makers set the pricing function P (·). At time 1−, the monopolistic fast trader
trades u shares at price p1− . At time 1, the informed trader’s order x, noise traders’ order
z, and the fast trader’s second order −u arrive simultaneously and are executed at price
p1. At time 1
+, market makers update the quote price to p1+ .
place orders at time 0+ and the orders are executed at time 1 after a short delay.
Second, the fast trader is also faster than market makers because market makers
cannot update the pricing function when multiple trades take place within the short
time window [1−, 1]. Ideally market makers would like to adjust the pricing schedule
P (·) whenever they observe new information. In practice many traders who submit
limit order do not have the most powerful computers or the fastest connections.
They can only update their limit orders with delays. During the delays, their limit
orders become stale and faster traders could quickly pick off the stale orders. To
capture the lagged adjustment of the limit orders, pricing function P (·) is set at time
0 and cannot be updated until time 1+.
Although market makers are perfectly competitive, trade prices deviate from
the informationally efficient levels. Effectively, lags in adjusting the pricing schedule
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P (·) prevent market makers from using all information to price the orders in the
time window [1−, 1].
The opening quote p0 and the closing quote p1+ are still informationally efficient
by assumption. In practice limit order submitters eventually update their orders
when trading activities wane and markets cool down.
1.2.3 Discussion on the holding horizon and information
The fast trader is averse to holding inventory and must liquidate her position
by the end of a trading round. This assumption of short holding horizons, although
restrictive, is consistent with most empirical studies of high frequency traders such
as Kirilenko et al. (2011) and Baron et al. (2012). In fact, one characteristic used by
SEC (2010) to define high frequency traders is that they have “very short time-frames
for establishing and liquidating positions.”
The short holding horizon has important implication on the fast trader’s
behavior and choice of information. Unlike the informed trader, the strategic fast
trader incurs price impact twice in one trading round. When establishing a position,
the fast trader must have a plan to exit within a short time window. The fast
trader’s profit is not determined by the difference between her entry price and the
fundamental value, but by the difference between her entry and exit prices. Hence,
the fast trader do not try to infer the long-term fundamental value of the risky asset
but focus on predicting short-term price dynamics.
Consistent with the short holding horizon, I assume that the fast trader
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produces a signal Iy about the aggregate incoming order flow y = x+ z, not about
the fundamental value v. The fast trader has no incentive to differentiate orders
from the informed trader and orders from the noise traders as long as the orders have
the identical price impact per share. In fact, if noise traders’ order size z dominates
the informed trader’s order size x as in the continuous time models of Kyle (1985)
and Back (1992), the fast trader would try to correlate her trades mostly with the
noise trading z.
The fast trader’s advance information about incoming order flow could come
from various sources. In practice, HFTs often have faster access to the exchanges’
more detailed data feeds. Coupled with their computation power, HFTs could
continuously track updates to the limit order books and quickly detect patterns in
the order flow. They could also gain information advantage in more fragmented
markets when orders are constantly routed between different trading venues.
Specifying the fast trader’s information Iy as a noisy signal of the incoming
order also encompasses several alternative information sources. For example, if a fast
trader could parse a public news faster but less accurately, the fast trader effectively
anticipates the informed trader’s order x; if a fast trader is able to detect some
retail noise traders’ less sophisticated execution algorithm, the fast trader effectively
predicts noise trading order flow z.9
9 Budish et al. (2013) find that when observed at the millisecond precision, price correlation of




Definition 1.2.1 (Equilibrium conditions). The fast trader chooses her trade
size using a strategy function U(·) and the informed trader chooses her trade size
using a function X(·). Market makers commit to a pricing function P (·) and set
the final quote using a function Q(·). The equilibrium is defined by four functions
U(·), X(·), P (·) and Q(·) such that the following conditions hold:
1. Informed trader profit maximization. Given P (·), U(·), and the asset’s true
value v, the informed trader’s profit πI = x(v − p1) is maximized if she trades
x∗ shares, i.e.,




πI |v, P (·), U(·)
]
(1.2.2)
where p1 is the execution price of her trade.
2. Fast trader profit maximization. Given P (·), X(·), and a signal about the
incoming order flow Iy = x+ z + ey the fast trader’s profit π
F = u(p1 − p1−) is
maximized if she trades u∗ shares at time 1− and liquidates at time 1, i.e.,




πF |Iy, P (·), X(·)
]
(1.2.3)
where p1 − p1− is the difference between her entry and exit prices.
3. Competitive pricing function. Given X(·) and U(·), market makers choose a








4. Informationally efficient quotes. Market makers set quotes p0 and p1+ to be
their expected value of v conditional on available information F0 and F1+ .
p0 = E[v] (1.2.5)
p1+ = E[v|F1+ , X(·), U(·)] = Q(F1+ ;X(·), U(·)) (1.2.6)
Remark 1.2.1. Market makers’ profits in Equation (1.2.4) is πM = up1− + (x+ z −
u)p1 − (x+ z)v because they trade −u shares at price p1− and −(x+ z − u) shares
at price p1.
Remark 1.2.2. Setting p1+ has no impact on equilibrium because the game ends at
time 1+. When there are multiple rounds of trading, setting p1+ to be the posterior
expectation makes it an appropriate initial reference quote for the next trading
round.
The strategy functions U(·), X(·), P (·) and Q(·) can be very general. For tractability,
I assume that market makers choose the pricing function P (·) from the following
class of linear functions.
Assumption 1 (Linear pricing function). Upon receiving the j-th market order
of ytj shares at time tj ∈ (0, 1], market makers fill the order at the average price of
ptj = P (ytj ,Ftj) = ptj−1 + λTytj , j ≥ 1 (1.2.7)
If ytj is the first arriving order (j = 1), the reference price pt0 is the initial quote p0;
if j > 1, ptj−1 is the average price of the previous traded market order. The price
impact (market depth) factor λT is fixed in the trading round.
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Assumption 1 reduces the choice of the pricing function P (·) to the choice of two
parameters: the initial quote p0 and the price impact factor λ
T . As discussed in the
previous section, a fixed λT captures the latency in limit order book adjustment. It
also seems reasonable that the price impact factor λT is fixed in short intervals when
all market orders are anonymous. In practice traders break their large meta-orders
into small trades and execute over time. The small trades are all stochastically
sequenced together and there is no clear start or end of a trading round. It is unlikely
that the limit order submitters would be able to infer the originator of orders and
change pricing function accordingly, especially in very short intervals.
Lemma 1.2.1. In the benchmark model, t0 = 0, t1 = 1
−, and t2 = 1. Given
Assumption 1, the traded prices are
p1− = p0 + λ
Tu (1.2.8)
p1 = p1− + λ
T (x+ z − u) = p0 + λT (x+ z) (1.2.9)
It might seem that the execution price p1 for the informed and noise traders
are not affected by the fast trader’s trading u because the fast trader completely
liquidates her position at time 1. The observation, however, is not correct because
in equilibrium the price impact factor λT is endogenously determined by the fast
trader’s trading intensity. We now examine the equilibrium.
Theorem 1.2.2 (Equilibrium of the benchmark model). Given Assumption
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1, there is a unique equilibrium where
Fast trading size: u∗ = U(Iy; p0, λ
T ) = αŷ = αρIy (1.2.10)
Informed trading size: x∗ = X(v; p0, λ
T ) = β (v − p0) (1.2.11)
Market order pricing: ptj = P (yj, ptj−1) = ptj−1 + λ
Tyj (1.2.12)
Initial quote: p0 = v0 (1.2.13)
Final quote: p1+ = Q(u, y − u) = p0 + λPy (1.2.14)


























Proof. See Appendix A.1. The proof covers the more general case where the fast
trader is risk averse with an exponential utility functions. Theorem 1.2.2 here is a
special case when risk aversion coefficient equals zero.
1.2.5 Equilibrium analysis
The strategy functions X(·), U(·), and Q(·) are all linear if the pricing function
P (·) is linear. The equilibrium is then fully characterized by the four endogenous
parameters α, β, λT , and λP illustrated in Figure 1.2:
The parameter α is fast trader’s trading intensity. The fast trader first observes
a signal Iy of the incoming order flow y and estimate the order flow to be ŷ = ρIy.
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Then, the fast trader choose to trade u = αŷ shares at time 1− and −αŷ at time 1.
A higher intensity α indicates that the fast trader trades more given an estimated
order flow ŷ.
Trading intensity β characterizes the informed trader’s strategy. The informed
trader first calculates the pricing error v − p0 using her private information v and
the initial quote p0. She then submits a market order of x = β(v − p0) shares. A
higher β indicates that the informed trader trades more aggressively based on the
same pricing error v − p0.
The parameter λT represents the temporary price impact per share of an market
order on the transaction price pt.
10 Transaction price responds to the order flow
according to the pricing function ∆pt = λ
Tyt. Effectively, market makers charge
λTy2 to execute a market order of y shares. Competitive market makers set λT
just enough such that their revenues for executing trades exactly offset their loss in
trading with the informed and the fast trader. A higher λT means that it costs more
to execute a market order of any given size.
The slope λP represents the permanent price impact per share on the final
quote p1+ of the aggregated order size x + z. The difference between the closing
quote p1+ and the opening quote p0 equals λ
P (x+ z). Because market makers are
competitive, the quote update p1+ − p0 is determined by the information content
of the order flow x+ z. A higher λP indicates that the aggregate order flow x+ z






















Figure 1.2: Equilibrium strategies. ∆p = λy is the pricing function without fast trader.
When a fast trader is present, market makers raise λT and lower λP . At time 0, market
makers set p0 and λ
T ; at time 1−, the fast trader trades u = ŷ/2 shares at price p1− =
p0 + λ
Tu; at time 1, the informed trades x shares, the noise traders z shares, and the fast
trader −u shares at the price p1 = p1− + λT (x + z − u) = p0 + λT y; finally at time 1+,
market makers set the quote to p1+ = p0 + λ
P y. The shaded rectangle is the fast trader’s
profit πF . Its area is 1/4 of rectangle OABC which corresponds to market makers’ price
impact surplus λT ŷ2.
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p1+ − p0 is more sensitive to x+ z.
The fast trading intensity α always equals 1/2. Both the fast trader and
the informed trader are risk neutral, strategic, and monopolistic. They maximize
expected profit by pushing the price half way toward the level at which they expect
to exit their positions.11
The other three endogenous parameters β, λT , and λP are determined by three
exogenous parameters: volatility of the fundamental value σv, volatility of noise
trading σz, and information quality of the fast trader ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The equilibrium
effects of σz and σv are similar to the Kyle (1985). In addition, we can set σv = σz = 1
by choosing certain units of currency and trade size.
Fast trader’s information quality ρ, however, is invariant to change of units.
When the fast trader has no information (ρ = 0), the equilibrium reduces to the
equilibrium of the static model of Kyle (1985). When the fast trader has some
information ρ > 0, the equilibrium differs qualitatively.
Corollary 1.2.3. Other things equal, when the fast trader’s information becomes
more accurate (ρ ↑), temporary price impact increases (λT ↑), permanent price
impact decreases (λP ↓), informed trading intensity declines (β ↓), and the fast
trading intensity α is unchanged.
10 λT is not entirely temporary. It includes the permanent price impact λP .
11 When the fast trader is risk averse, her trading intensity is indeed lower when σv ↑, σz ↑, or
her information quality ρ ↓. See Appendix A.1 for a generalize Theorem where the fast trader has
a negative exponential utility and Appendix A.1.4 for a brief discussion of the equilibrium impact
of the fast trader’s risk aversion.
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Proof. Follows from Theorem 1.2.2.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the equilibrium impact of fast trader’s information quality
ρ. Due to the existence of fast traders, market makers cannot break-even if they set
the price p1 to equal their posterior expectation. The fast trader profitably intercepts
u shares of the order flow x + z: she acquires u shares from market makers at a
discounted price p1− and supplies the shares back to the informed and noise traders
at a profit. To make up for the loss to the fast trader, market makers have to charge
more to absorb the same order imbalance. They raise the temporary price impact
factor λT above the permanent price impact λP implied by the informativeness of
the order flow. Market makers’ break-even price at time 1 thus differs from their
posterior conditional expectation.
When the signal Iy is more accurate signal (ρ ↑), the fast trader makes more
profit. Market makers raise the temporary price impact (λT ↑) more to break even.
The informed trader responds by reduce her trading intensity (β ↓). Because the
informed trader’s order x is the only informative component of the order flow x+ z,
the aggregate order flow x+ z becomes less informative (λP ↓).
This section develops the benchmark model with one fast trader and illustrates
that the fast trader can profit on a less accurate signal Iy if she is faster than others.
In addition to the “information rents”, market makers have to pay the “speed rents”.
Because market makers are not the fastest, they protect themselves by setting a
steeper pricing schedule. The informed traders reduce her trading intensity faced
with a higher cost of transacting. These results are not surprising given the assumed
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behavior of the fast traders. Profits attract the entry of similar fast traders. How
does the equilibrium change if more fast traders compete? In the next section, I
develop the general model in which multiple strategic front-runners with different
speeds compete.

















Permanent price impact λP
Fast trader’s information quality ρ
(a) Equilibrium price impact /σv
σz
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Informed trading intensity β/ σz
σv
Fast trading intensity α
Fast trader’s information quality ρ
(b) Equilibrium trading intensity
Figure 1.3: Equilibrium parameters of the benchmark model normalized by volatility
of fundamental value σv and volatility of noise trading σz. Theorem 1.2.2 implies that
when the fast trader’s information Iy is more informative (higher ρ) about the incoming
order, temporary price impact per share λT increases, permanent price impact per share
λP decreases, informed trading intensity β decreases, and fast trading intensity α stays
the same.
1.3 Model of multiple fast traders
In the benchmark model, after controlling for noise trading volatility σz and
fundamental uncertainty σv, the monopolistic fast trader’s information quality ρ
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fully characterizes the equilibrium. I now consider the case in which multiple high
frequency traders with different speeds compete in the same market. I characterize
the equilibrium with multiple fast traders and examine parameters that affect the
equilibrium apart from the fast traders’ information quality ρ.
1.3.1 Generalized model setup
Normal-speed traders have the same action timings as in the benchmark model:
the informed and noise traders trade once at time 1; market makers set the pricing
function P (·) at time t0 = 0 and update the quote to p1+ when the trading round
ends.
I modify the timeline to accommodate multiple fast traders. There are N
strategic fast traders. As in the benchmark model, each fast trader is able to trade
twice until time 1 and fast traders are not allowed to carry inventory after time 1.
At time 0+ a signal Iy = y + ey with exogenous quality ρ = Corr
2(Iy, y) ∈ (0, 1] is
generated. To focus on the effect of speed differences, the same signal is distributed
to all N fast traders.12
Each fast trader receives the signal Iy with different delays, analyzes it at
different speeds, and submits an order with different latencies. Fast traders’ orders
also suffer from latencies but their latencies are much shorter than normal-speed
traders’. Between time 0+ and time 1, fast traders’ orders sequentially arrive in
12 Possible information cascades phenomena as in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) are
not modeled because the common signal assumption makes it unnecessary for slower fast traders to
learn from earlier trades.
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J instants 0+ < t1 < t2 · · · < tJ < 1. At time tj, nj orders arrive simultaneously.
Naturally N =
∑
j nj. The speed of a fast trader is measured by the her order
arrival time tj. The difference between tj and 0
+ includes the signal transmitting
time, the signal processing time, and her order latency. A fast trader is indexed by
j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , J} and k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , nj}.
Definition 1.3.1 (Speed profile of fast traders). The speed profile of fast traders
is a vector of J numbers {n1, n2, · · · , nJ} where nj ≥ 0 is the number of fast traders
arriving at time tj. The speed profile is common knowledge among all traders.
Two special speed profiles are particularly important because their equilibrium
properties are on the two extremes among all possible speed profiles.
Definition 1.3.2 (Stackelberg-N speed profile). Each of the N fast traders arrives
at a different moment and the speed profile is {1, 1, · · · , 1}.
Definition 1.3.3 (Cournot-N speed profile). All N fast traders arrive at the same
time and the speed profile is {N}.
Upon arriving at time tj, fast trader (j, k) uses all available information,
including the signal Iy and the last traded price ptj−1 , to chooses a trade size uj,k. I
introduce two notations of fast traders’ order sizes: uj denotes the total order size
from fast traders arriving at time tj and Sj−1 denotes the total order size from fast
traders arriving before time tj.














u0,k = 0 and n0 = 1 for completeness.
Since fast traders could not carry inventory beyond time 1, each fast trader
must completely exit her position uj,k using the second trade. When is the best time
to exit? In the benchmark model the monopolistic trader exits at time 1 because
exiting any earlier would make her profit zero. When there are multiple fast traders,
it is still optimal for all fast traders to exit at time 1 simultaneously. All fast traders
have the same information and same preference (risk neutral). A fast trader arriving
earlier knows that a later fast trader would only enter a position if it is profitable. If
it is profitable for a later fast trader to enter, then it is profitable for the earlier fast
trader to wait. Hence all fast traders liquidate at time 1 when they cannot wait any
longer. The time 1 net order flow is y −∑j,k uj,k.
Market makers observe J + 1 net market orders {u1, u2, · · · , uJ , y −
∑
i ui}
at J + 1 moments {t1, t2, · · · , tJ , 1}. They execute the orders at the prices of
{pt1 , pt2 , · · · , ptJ , p1} according to the pricing function P (·) set at time 0.
1.3.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium conditions differ from Definition 1.2.1 only in the condition about fast
traders. I select the symmetric equilibrium where fast traders arriving at the same
time trade the same quantity.
Definition 1.3.5 (Modified equilibrium condition for fast traders). Given
the pricing function P (·), the informed trader’s strategy X(·), a signal Iy = y + ey
about the incoming order flow y, the price of the last trade ptj−1 , and strategies
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Uj,l() of other fast traders (l 6= k) arriving simultaneously at time j, fast trader (j, k)
maximizes her profit πFj,k if she trades u
∗
j,k shares at time tj and liquidate her position
at time 1, i.e.,





πFj,k = u(p1 − ptj)
∣∣Iy, P (·), X(·), ptj−1 , Uj,l(·) for l 6= k ]
In the symmetric equilibrium u∗j,k = u
∗
j,l for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , J} and k, l ∈
{1, 2, · · · , nj}.
Theorem 1.3.1 (Equilibrium with oligopolistic fast traders). Given a linear
pricing function as in Assumption 1, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where
(j, k)-th fast trading size: u∗j,k = Uj,k (ŷ, Sj−1) =
αj
nj
(ŷ − Sj−1) (1.3.3)
Informed trading size: x∗ = X(v, p0) = β (v − p0) (1.3.4)
Pricing function: ptj = P (yj, ptj−1) = ptj−1 + λ
Tyj, (1.3.5)
Initial quote: p0 = v0 (1.3.6)
Final quote: p1+ = Q(u, y − u) = v0 + λPy (1.3.7)



































Let α0 = 0 for completeness.
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
Remark 1.3.1. When there is only one fast trader, J = 1, n1 = 1, and γ = 1/4.
Equilibrium reduces to the special case given in Theorem 1.2.2.
Remark 1.3.2. Observing the last traded price ptj−1 is equivalent to observing the
shares trade by earlier fast traders Sj−1 because ptj−1 = p0 + λ
TSj−1. In addition,









. In equilibrium, since all fast traders observe the same
signal Iy, each fast trader can calculate the earlier fast traders’ order sizes. Hence,
they do not have to observe the last traded price.
Remark 1.3.3. As discussed in the benchmark model, one can always set σv = σz = 1
by changing the units of currency and order size. In the following discussion, the
effects of σv and σz are normalized.
Fast trader (j, k) is k-th of the nj fast traders arriving at time tj. Each of the
nj traders acts like a Cournot competitor and trades
1
nj+1
of the residual incoming
order size ŷ− Sj−1. After time-tj fast traders trade uj shares, the residual order flow
is reduced to ŷ − Sj = ŷ − Sj−1 − uj. Traders arriving next at time tj+1 follow a
similar Cournot strategy and trade
nj+1
1+nj+1
of the residual order flow ŷ − Sj. Figure
1.4 illustrates the equilibrium strategies when the speed profile is {2, 1}.
13 ρ ∈ [0, 1] by definition. Proposition A.3.1 on page 126 proves that 0 ≤ γ < 1 for any J ≥ 0.



























Figure 1.4: Equilibrium strategies when speed profile is {2, 1}. ∆p = λy is the pricing
function without fast trader. When fast traders are present, market makers raise λT and
lower λP . At time 0, market makers set p0 and λ
T ; at time t1, two fast traders arrive
and together trade u1 = 2ŷ/3 shares at price pt1 = p0 + λ
Tu1; at time t2, one fast trader
trades u2 = ŷ/6 shares at price pt2 = p0 + λ
T (u1 + u2); at time 1, the informed trades x
shares, the noise traders trade z shares, and the fast traders −u1 − u2 shares at the price
p1 = p0 + λ
T y; at time 1+, market makers set the quote to p1+ = p0 + λ
P y. The shaded
rectangles are the profits of the two groups of fast traders πF1 and π
F
2 . The sum of π
F
1
and πF2 equals 1/4 of rectangle OABC which corresponds to market makers’ price impact
surplus λT y2.
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Normal-speed traders’ strategies X(·), P (·), and Q(·) and the choice parameters β,
λT , and λP in Eq.(1.3.8) have exactly the same functional forms as in the benchmark
model of Theorem 1.2.2. The key difference between the benchmark model and the
general model lies in the new parameter γ.
Definition 1.3.6 (Speed friction γ). Given a speed profile {n1, n2, · · · , nJ} of














for all 1 ≤ j ≤ J . Proposition A.3.1 shows that γ ∈ [0, 1).
Speed friction γ is the crucial parameter that summarizes all equilibrium-
relevant information in the profile of fast traders’ relative speeds. Roughly speaking,
speed friction γ is increasing in the heterogeneity of fast traders’ relative speeds. For
example, we calculate the speed friction for several special types of speed profile as
follows.
Proposition 1.3.2. Speed friction γ is easily calculated from Definition 1.3.6.
1. Monopoly speed profile {1}. γ = 1
4
.







3. Cournot-N speed profile {N}. γ = N
(1+N)2
.
Fast traders have more heterogeneous speeds in a Stackelberg speed profiles
than in a Cournot speed profile. And we can see that given the number of fast
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traders, a Stackelberg speed profile has higher speed friction than the Cournot speed
profiles.
Before investigate the properties of speed friction γ in detail, let’s first examine
its impact on equilibrium parameters. Speed friction γ and fast traders’ information
quality affect equilibrium through their impact on θ. Later, we will see that that
market quality is better when θ is higher.





∈ [0, 1] (1.3.11)
where ρ is fast traders’ information quality and γ is the speed friction.
Proposition 1.3.3. Keeping σv and σz constant, when speed friction decreases (γ ↓)
or fast traders’ information becomes less accurate (ρ ↓), market quality parameter
goes up (θ ↑), informed trading intensity goes up (β ↑), temporary price impact
declines (λT ↓), and permanent price impact increases (λP ↑). Fast trading intensity
αj is not affected.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1.3.1.
For given levels of uncertainty σv and σz, market quality parameter θ fully
characterizes the equilibrium for normal-speed traders. By definition, market quality
θ is solely determined by ργ, the product of fast traders’ information quality and
speed friction γ. Therefore, in equilibrium normal-speed traders only care about fast
traders’ information precision ρ and speed friction γ after controlling for σv and σz.
35
Figure 1.5 illustrates the impact of fast traders’ information quality ρ and speed
friction γ on equilibrium parameters.14








(a) Market quality θ








(b) Informed trading intensity β/σzσv









Fast traders’ information quality ρ
(c) Temporary price impact λT/σvσz








Fast traders’ information quality ρ
(d) Permanent price impact λP/σvσz
Figure 1.5: Equilibrium parameters of the general model normalized by volatility
of fundamental value σv and volatility of noise trading σz. Theorem 1.3.1 shows that
equilibrium is characterized by ργ where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is fast traders’ information quality and
γ ∈ [0, 1] is level of speed friction. Market quality parameter θ, informed trading intensity
β, and permanent price impact λP are decreasing in ργ; whereas temporary price impact
λT is increasing in ργ.
14 Because speed friction γ = 1/4 when only one fast trader is present, in the benchmark model,
equilibrium market quality θ =
√
1−ρ/4
1+ρ/4 is determined only by ρ.
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1.3.3 Discussion on ργ as a speed tax rate
Intuitively, fast traders levy a “speed tax” on the market makers with ργ being
the effective expected tax rate. When market makers receive an order of y shares,
they mark the price up by λTy and fill the order. The price impact surplus for
executing the trade is λTy2. Market makers use the surplus to offset the loss to the
informed trader and to pay the speed tax to fast traders. Later we will see that fast




. Conditional on her signal Iy,
fast traders take away a fraction γ of the expected price impact revenue E[λT ŷ2]. As
shown in Figure 1.2, the monopolistic fast trader takes away 1/4 of the total price
impact revenue and thus γ = 1/4 for the benchmark model. Unconditioned on Iy,
the effective tax rate on market makers’ price impact surplus is ργ.15
We can write an alternative model of financial transaction tax with this intuition.
Suppose after a trading round, with probability ρ market makers are taxed at the
rate of γ on their price impact surplus λTy2. This setup would generate the same
equilibrium strategies for the informed trader and market makers.
The effective tax rate ργ goes down either because fast traders have less
accurate signal (ρ ↓) or fast traders take away a smaller fraction (γ ↓) of market
makers’ price impact revenue. When the speed tax rate drops (ργ ↓), market makers
are able to use a larger fraction of the surplus E[λTy2] to cover loss to the informed
trader. Competition among market makers then drives down the temporary price
15 Subrahmanyam (1998) models the impact of a quadratic financial transaction tax levied on
the informed and noise traders’ orders.
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impact λT . Seeing a lower cost to trade (λT ↓), the informed trader increases trading
intensity (β ↑). As a result, the aggregate order flow contains more orders from the
informed trader. The permanent price impact λP increases since the order flow is
more informative.
1.4 Speed competition among fast traders
While they are already much faster than most other traders, HFTs keep invest-
ing in the latest speed technology to shave a few millisecond or even microseconds off
the latency. They co-locate computers with the exchange’s central matching engine;
they build fiber optic cables under the Arctic ocean; they build algorithms directly
into the hardware. Such investment is driven by the competition among peer HFTs.
The exchanges seem to be catering to the incessant demand for speed. They
continue to reduce latencies of order processing; they build large data centers and
lease co-location spots to traders; they provide sophisticated order types to facilitate
faster and conditional order execution; and they provide faster data feeds with
increasing granularity.
Regulators or market designers can introduce new rules to mitigate the impact
of front-running. The impact of such rules on normal-speed traders boils down to their
effects on fast trader’s information quality ρ and the speed friction γ. It is relatively
easy to conjecture a policy measure’s impact on ρ. In this section, I investigate
the properties of speed friction and examine the effect of speed competition on fast
traders and on normal-speed traders. Specifically, I address the following questions:
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(1) Why is speed vital to HFTs? (2) How does increased speed competition among
HFTs affect speed friction γ?
1.4.1 Fast traders’ profits and relative speeds
We can calculate the expected profit of all fast traders from Theorem 1.3.1.
Proposition 1.4.1 (Fast traders’ profit). In equilibrium, the expected profit of

































































, and nj is the number of fast traders of the j-th fastest
speed as in Theorem 1.3.1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
Not surprisingly, aggregate fast trading profit E[πF ] is increasing in the effective
speed tax rate ργ. Fast traders also make more profits when there is more uncertainty
about the fundamental value (σv ↑) or there is more noise trading (σz ↑). Fast traders’
profits come from the price impact of others’ trades. When there is more fundamental
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uncertainty (σv ↑), the price impact of trades is higher and front-running an order
of given size is more profitable. When there is more noise trading (σz ↑), trading
volume is higher and there are more orders to front-run.16
For an individual fast trader (j, k), the expected profit E[πFj,k] depends not on
her absolute speed but on her relative speed. As long as nj fast traders arrive at a
time in (tj−1, tj+1), their speed ranking stays the same and their expected profits do
not change.17
Proposition 1.4.2 (Fast traders’ profits and relative speed). Suppose nj > 0
fast traders arrive at time tj and nj+1 > 0 arrive at time tj+1. Then,
Expected profit of all fast traders at time tj






Expected profit of one fast trader at time tj
Expected profit of one fast trader at time tj+1
= (1 + nj+1)
2 ≥ 4
The ratios are minimized when nj = nj+1 = 1.
Proof. Follows from Eq. (1.4.2) of Proposition 1.4.1.
Speed establishes a pecking order. Fast traders have very strong incentives
to be relatively fast because higher speed translates to a two-fold advantage: faster
traders are able to acquire larger positions at better prices. For example, if each fast
16 This is consistent with the popular belief: “... two things [HFT] needs the most: trading
volume and price volatility”, Bloomberg Businessweek, http://goo.gl/NEQOV
17 In this model fast traders’ arrival timings are deterministic. Absolute speed could also matter
when arrive times are random because a larger advantage in absolute speed translates to a higher
probability of arriving earlier.
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trader has a different speed, then the j-th fast trader could pick up twice as many
shares as the (j + 1)-th fast trader and the price discount is twice as large. As a
result, a fast trader could quadruple her expected trading profits by moving up one
spot in the speed ranking among fast traders. Consistent with the model prediction,
Baron et al. (2012) find aggressive HFTs’ profits increase with their relative speeds.
The increasing return to being relatively fast offers one explanation of high
frequency traders’ obsession with speed. It might also explain the exchanges’ motive
to increase the trading frequency. Higher trading frequencies tend to create more
space for speed competition. For example, suppose the informed and noise traders’
latency is 1 second. If the trading platform allows 10 trades per second, fast traders
would have the highest profit if their orders arrive within the first 0.1 second. Suppose
the exchange upgrade the trading platform. Normal-speed traders’ latency is 0.1
second and the trading frequency is 1000 times per second. Then fast traders need
to arrive within the first 0.001 second to reap the highest profit. Exchange could
extract large rents by offering tiered access speeds to the markets.
1.4.2 Speed competition and speed friction γ
I have shown that the fast traders have strong incentives to engage in speed
competition because their profits decay rapidly as they go down in the speed ranking.
The impact of speed competition is not limited to fast traders. In this section, I
show that speed competition among fast traders affects speed friction γ and in turn
affects normal-speed traders by changing the effective speed tax rate ργ.
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Roughly speaking, speed friction γ increases with the heterogeneity of fast
traders’ relative speeds. Recall that the speed profile {n1, n2, · · · , nJ} describes the












where the equilibrium fast trading intensity is αj =
nj
nj+1
for all j. Speed friction γ is
not affected by other exogenous parameters σv, σz, v0, or ρ. It is determined solely
by fast traders’ speed profile {n1, n2, · · · , nJ}.18
Definition 1.4.1 (Equivalent speed profiles). Two speed profiles are equivalent
if they have the same speed friction γ.
Proposition 1.4.3. Adding 0 to (or removing 0 from) a speed profile does not change
speed friction.
Proof. {n1, n2, · · · , nj−1, 0, · · ·nJ} and {n1, n2, · · · , nj−1, nj+1, · · ·nJ} are equivalent
speed profiles because setting nj = 0 is equivalent to remove all nj related terms
from γ.
Proposition 1.4.4. Only the relative speeds of fast traders affect the speed friction
γ.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1.4.3 because changing absolute speed without
changing relative speed is equivalent to changing the ranking of some 0s in the speed
profile.
18 If fast traders are risk averse, ρ and γ become codependent through αj (Appendix A.1).
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The two results simplify analysis on speed friction γ. For example, consider
three speed profiles {1, 0, 0, 0, 2}, {1, 0, 2}, and {0, 0, 0, 1, 2}. At the first glance they
look quite different. In the three profiles, fast traders arrive at different times and
the speed differences between the two groups of fast traders are not the same. The
speed profiles, however, are all equivalent because after removing the 0s they all
reduce to the speed profile {1, 2}. The equilibrium is exactly the same as long as 1
trader is the fastest and 2 traders are the second fastest.
Example 1: We illustrate the effect of speed competition on fast traders’ profit and
on the overall speed friction with an example. The example is illustrated in Figure
1.6. Suppose four fast traders, A,B,C, and D, are trading.
1. Initially four traders have the same speed and the starting speed profile is
Cournot {4}. The speed friction γ = 4
25
= 0.16. All traders make the same
expected profit.
2. Suppose the exchange increases the trading frequency. Trader A, B, and C
subscribe to the upgraded co-location service. The speed profile becomes {3, 1}
and the speed friction γ increases to 13
64
≈ 0.20. According to Proposition 1.4.2,
trader A,B, and C each makes 4 times as much profit as trader D. The ratio of
the four traders’ profits is 4 : 4 : 4 : 1.
3. Suppose trader A purchases the most advanced computer and becomes even
faster than B and C. The speed profile becomes {1, 2, 1} and the speed friction
γ increases to 0.31. The ratio of the four traders’ profits is 36 : 4 : 4 : 1.
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4. Suppose trader B improves the algorithm and becomes faster than C but is
slower than A. The speed profile becomes Stackelberg {1, 1, 1, 1} and the speed
friction γ further increases to 0.33. The ratio of the four traders’ profits is
64 : 16 : 4 : 1.













A B C D
γ = 0.20
Speed profile {3 1}
A B C D
γ = 0.31
Speed profile {1 2 1}
A B C D
γ = 0.33
Speed profile {1 1 1 1}
Figure 1.6: Effect of speed competition on fast traders’ profits.
We see from the example that fast traders have strong incentive to become
relatively faster. As the trading frequency increases, fast traders race to step ahead.
Normal-speed traders could experience higher or lower speed frictions depending on
how the speed profile evolves.
Example 2: Equation (1.4.4) is all one needs to compute the speed friction γ of
any given speed profile. For example, suppose 3 fast traders are in the market. We
know from Proposition 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 that all speed profiles can be reduced to one
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of {1, 1, 1}, {1, 2}, {2, 1}, and {3}. Their speed frictions are:
















































































We have two important observations from the example and it turns out they
are true in general.
1. Because γ{1,1,1} > γ{1,2} > γ{2,1} > γ{3}, the Cournot-3 speed profile {3} has
the lowest speed friction γ and the Stackelberg-3 speed profile {1, 1, 1} has the
highest among all possible speed profiles with 3 fast traders.
2. Recall that in the monopoly fast trader model, speed friction γ = 1
4
. Here,
γ{1,1,1} > γ{1,2} > γ{2,1} =
1
4
> γ{3}. When 3 fast traders compete, the speed
friction γ can be higher, equal, or lower than the speed friction when there is
only one monopolistic fast trader.
Remark 1.4.1. Speed friction γ is increasing in the heterogeneity of fast traders’
relative speeds. So γ{1,1,1} > γ{2,1} > γ{3}. Speed friction γ includes additional
information about the competition among fast traders. For example, speed profile
{2, 1} and {1, 2} have the same speed heterogeneity but γ{2,1} < γ{1,2}. Intuitively,
increased competition at time t1 reduces aggregate fast trading profits more because
fast traders at time 1 are more profitable.
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Proposition 1.4.5. Suppose N fast traders are in the market.














Proof. See Appendix A.3.3.
Proposition 1.4.6. Suppose one new fast trader enters the market.
1. If the new fast trader has the same speed as some existing fast traders, after
the entry, speed friction γ declines; 19
2. If the new fast trader has a different speed from all existing fast traders, after
the entry, speed friction γ increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.2.
The entry of fast traders can increase or decrease the level of speed friction γ
depending on the entrant’s speed relative to existing fast traders.
19 When fast traders are risk averse, same speed entries could increase speed friction. Intuitively,
two risk averse Cournot fast traders in aggregate may trade like a monopolistic risk neutral fast
trader. A risk averse fast trader chooses a trading intensity α lower than the risk neutral monopoly
level of 1/2. As more of such risk averse fast traders enter, their aggregate trading intensity increases
and could be closer to 1/2. Eventually, however, α keeps increasing beyond 1/2 when more such
fast traders enter. Speed friction γ keeps dropping and converges to the same limit as the risk
neutral case.
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On one hand, suppose all existing fast traders and entrants have the same speed.
Then, as new fast traders enter, they form a series of Cournot-N speed profiles. As
N increases, the speed friction γ = N
(N+1)2
keeps dropping and converges to zero
when N →∞. Intuitively, when fast traders have the same speed, they compete on
quantity in a Cournot competition. When more fast traders are present, they bid
up their entry price (when they buy). The profit margin becomes smaller and their
aggregate profits keep declining. Aggregate fast trading profits become a smaller
fraction γ of market makers’ expected price impact revenue. Since the effective speed
tax rate ργ decreases, market makers pay less speed tax to fast traders and they
can lower the temporary price impact amplifier λT/λP . In the limit when N →∞,
speed tax goes to zero and λT/λP → 1. The impact of fast traders vanishes. 20
On the other hand, suppose every entrant has a different speed. Then, as new
fast traders enter, they form a series of Stackelberg-N speed profiles. The speed






keeps increasing with N and converges to 1
3
as N → ∞.
Intuitively, each new fast trader is a local monopoly before the next trader arrives.
Each of them trades away half of the residual order ŷ − Sj−1 and makes 14ρ of
the residual profits. Multiple fast traders effectively split a large trade into small
pieces and march along the supply curve. A series of monopolies are worse than one
monopoly fast trader because their combined speed is higher than the speed of any
individual fast trader. In aggregate, fast traders have more trading opportunities in
a trading round. Although fast traders do not collude, in aggregate they are more
20 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) find that when infinitely many predators compete, their
effect vanishes because predators effectively have the same speed in their model.
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profitable. The market does not break down as N →∞ because the effective speed
tax rate ργ < ρ
3
< 1. Market makers can still afford to pay the speed tax and cover
their loss to the informed trader by raising the temporary price impact λT . Entry
of more fast traders does not drive the total speed tax to zero. It only drives the
slowest fast trader’s profit to zero.21
Figure 1.7 illustrates an example. Starting from the profile {2, 1}, speed friction
γ keeps declining if new entrants all have the same speed as the fastest trader. The
speed profile evolves from {2, 1} to {3, 1}, {4, 1}, {5, 1}, and so on. Speed friction γ
becomes closer to the Cournot-N lower bound.
Alternatively, if every new entrant is faster than all existing traders, speed
friction γ keeps increasing. The speed profiles evolves from {2, 1} to {1, 2, 1},
{1, 1, 2, 1}, {1, 1, 1, 2, 1} and so on. Speed friction γ approaches the Stackelberg-N
upper bound very quickly.
Remark 1.4.2. Entry of multiple fast traders at one new speed could reduce speed
friction. For example, if an infinite number of traders with the highest speed enter,
then speed friction γ goes to zero. A change from speed profile {n1, n2 = 0, n3} to
speed profile {n1, n2 = n, n3} can be achieved in multiple steps by adding 1 to n2 in
each step. The first entry changes n2 from 0 to 1 and it increases speed friction γ;
the subsequent entries at t2 reduce speed friction γ. The net effect depends on the
number of fast traders entering at t2.
21 If N fast traders collude, the key result still holds: allowing them to have different speeds
weakens the price competition among fast traders. When fast traders have different speeds, they
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Number of fast traders
Speed friction γ
Figure 1.7: Effect of entry fast traders on speed friction γ. Given the number of
fast traders N , a speed profile’s level of speed friction γ is bounded by Stackelberg-N
from above and by Cournot-N from below. Starting from speed profile {2, 1}, speed
friction γ keeps going down if new fast traders keep entering at t1 and speed profiles
become {3, 1} → {4, 1} → {5, 1} → {6, 1}; whereas speed friction γ keeps increasing
if new fast traders keep entering with higher speeds than existing fast traders and
speed profile becomes {1, 2, 1} → {1, 1, 2, 1} → {1, 1, 1, 2, 1}.
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Without knowing the cost of speed, we cannot pin down the long-term equilib-
rium level of speed friction γ. The following result suggests that under quite general
conditions, the impact of fast traders does not vanish even when infinitely many fast
traders compete.
Proposition 1.4.7 (Speed friction in the limit). Suppose N fast traders are
present and n1 > 0 of the N traders are the fastest. In the limit when N → ∞,
speed friction vanishes if and only if n1 →∞, i.e.,
lim
N→∞
γ = 0 ⇐⇒ lim
N→∞
n1 =∞ (1.4.5)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.4.
Due to physical limits, e.g. the number of co-location spots, only a very limited
number of traders can be the fastest in a continuous market. Even adding infinite
number of traders at the second highest speed would not eliminate speed friction γ.
1.5 Market quality
I have shown that speed competition affects the relative profit of each fast
trader and affects the speed friction γ. In this section, I study how fast traders’
information quality ρ and speed friction γ affect the information aggregation and
liquidity provision functions of a financial market.
extract more aggregate profits than when they have the same speed. See Appendix A.7.
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1.5.1 Information efficiency
In the context of this paper, fundamental value of the risky asset v is the
informed trader’s private information. If people learn more about v by observing the
trading process, the market is more informationally efficient.
Definition 1.5.1 (Information efficiency). Information efficiency at time t is
defined as φt = 1 − Var[v|Ft]Var[v] ∈ [0, 1] where Ft represents the public information at
time t. Specifically,








where t1 is the time when the first fast trader arrives.
22
Information efficiency φt measures how much uncertainty about the fundamental
value v is resolved by time t. If people have learned the true value v precisely by time
t, then Var[v|Ft] = 0 and information efficiency φt = 1; if people have not learned
any information about v by time t, Var[v|Ft] = Var[v] and φt = 0.
We need two information efficiency measures to describe the information
revealed at different moments of the trading round. The intermediate information
efficiency φt1 measures how much information about v is revealed by the first fast
trader. Because fast traders observe the same signal Iy, no additional information
about v is revealed in the time window (t1, 1). The ex post information efficiency φ1+
22 Variance captures the level of uncertainty about the normally distributed v. For general
distributions, we could use entropy in lieu of variance.
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measures how much information about v is revealed by the end of the trading round.
Proposition 1.5.1 (Equilibrium information efficiency). In equilibrium,












Proof. See Appendix A.4.1.
Corollary 1.5.2. Speed friction γ and fast traders’ information quality ρ determine
the information efficiency of the market.
1. When speed friction is higher (γ ↑), intermediate and ex post information
efficiencies are both lower (φ1− ↓ and φ1+ ↓).
2. When fast traders’ information quality is more accurate (ρ ↑), intermediate
information efficiency goes up (φ1− ↑) while ex post information efficiency goes
down (φ1+ ↓).
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1.5.1.
Figure 1.8 illustrates the impact of fast traders’ information quality ρ and
speed friction γ on information efficiency. The intermediate information efficiency
equals a fraction ρ of the ex post efficiency, i.e., φt1 = ρφ1+ . Fast traders effectively
bring part of the information to the market earlier at time t1.
A high speed friction γ impedes informed trading because it raises the temporary
price impact λT . Ex post information efficiency φ1+ is lower because the order flow
contains less orders from the informed trader. The intermediate efficiency φt1 is also
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Fast traders’ information quality ρ
(a) Intermediate information efficiency φt1












Fast traders’ information quality ρ
(b) Ex post information efficiency φ1+
Figure 1.8: Equilibrium information efficiency. Intermediate information efficiency
φt1 increases with fast traders’ information quality ρ and decreases with speed
friction γ; ex post information efficiency φ1+ decreases with ρ and γ. Intermediate
information efficiency φt1 equals a fraction ρ of the ex post information efficiency
φ1+ for all cases.
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lower because fast traders bring a fixed fraction ρ of the ex post information to t1.
To improve information efficiency we need to lower speed friction γ.
In models of informed trading such as Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992),
Foster and Viswanathan (1996), Back et al. (2000), Bernhardt and Miao (2004),
and Li (2013), an informed trader often ramps up her trading intensity when faced
with the competition from other informed traders with highly positively correlated
information.23 The elevated informed trading intensity then leads to more informative
prices.
In this study, fast traders infer similar but less accurate information about v
from the order flow signal Iy. Yet, faced with the pressure from fast traders, the
informed trader reduces rather than increases her trading intensity. As a result ex
post information efficiency φ1+ is lower.
The opposite impact on ex post information efficiency highlights the difference
between fast traders and competing informed traders. Typically when a informed
trader chooses a trading intensity, she faces the trade-off of price impact and informa-
tion decay. If an informed trader slows down, her private information is traded away
by competing informed traders; if an informed trader speeds up, her price impact is
higher.24
23 Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Back et al. (2000) show that the trading game eventually
turns into the “waiting game” stage when multiple informed traders refrain from trading. By the
time the game reaches the waiting game stage, however, the informed traders’ residual private
information has become negatively correlated.
24 Kyle, Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) recently develop a continuous time model where every
trader is overconfident, has a flow of private information, and endogenously chooses an optimal
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In this model, the informed trader does not have the incentive to speed up for
two reasons: (1) she cannot reduce information decay by trading more intensively
because fast traders always anticipate the order flow; and (2) if the informed does
not trade, her information is not traded away by fast traders because fast traders
do not have an independent source of information about fundamentals. Hence the
informed trader always slow down the trading in response to a higher temporary
price impact λT . As a result, the more information fast traders know, the slower
the informed trader trades and the less information is revealed by the end of each
trading round.
A higher ρ, however, improves intermediate information efficiency φt1 . Proposi-
tion 1.5.1 shows that φt1 = ρφ1+ . Despite the dampening effect on φ1+ , in equilibrium
intermediate information efficiency φt1 increases with ρ because fast traders bring a
larger fraction ρ of the ex post information to intermediate moments.
Nevertheless, the social value of intermediate information efficiency is ques-
tionable. Intermediate information efficiency could be socially valuable if (1) people
can use the intermediate information to make a welfare enhancing economic decision
and (2) the cost of delaying the decision from time t1 to time 1
+ is very high. Both
conditions are unlikely to be true when holding horizons are at the minute or second
level. It is hard to imagine a case when normal-speed traders and outside agents
must use p1− to make economic meaningful decisions. Even if the information is
crucial, they could wait until time 1+ and use a more informative price p1+ . After
all, fast trading is profitable because other traders cannot react fast enough in the
trading speed.
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time window [1−, 1+].
Therefore, although we face a trade-off between intermediate and ex post
information efficiency, from the social welfare perspective, one probably should
not raise ρ to improve the intermediate information efficiency at the expense of ex
post information efficiency. Fast traders’ production of order flow information Iy
is a classic example of socially wasteful production of “foreknowledge” (Hirshleifer
(1971)).
Fast traders make intermediate prices more informative by trading earlier during time
(t1, 1) on a noisy signal Iy. The closing quote p1+ , however, is less informative because
the informed trader reduces trading intensity. Fast traders’ effect on the order flow
is similar to a prying messenger’s effect on a letter. Suppose a messenger (HFT)
glances at a letter (order flow) and summarizes it to the receiver (market) right before
delivering it. The summary (a HFT trade) is informative but its information value is
fleeting: the letter itself is much more informative than the summary. Furthermore,
the sender (the informed) is less likely to write clearly ex ante worrying about privacy
issues and ultimately the receiver (market) is less informed.
In sum, to improve the more economically meaningful ex post information




In this paper, noise traders trade for non-informational motives; a market is
less liquid if noise traders expect to lose more to trade the same number of shares.
Market liquidity also affects the informed trader because trading is anonymous.
Vayanos and Wang (2012) point out that different measures of market liquidity
are designed to capture different market frictions. In the end, however, all the
measures attempt to capture the impact of market friction on traders’ economic
profits. Thus, in addition to the traditional measure λT , I also use normal-speed
traders’ expected profit to measure market liquidity.
Proposition 1.5.3 (Equilibrium expected profits). In equilibrium,








































as in Theorem 1.3.1.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.2.
Corollary 1.5.4 (Market liquidity and fast trading). Keep σvσz fixed. In
equilibrium, market is less liquid when fast traders’ information becomes more accurate
(ρ ↑) or speed friction goes up (γ ↑): temporary price impact is higher (λT ↑), the
informed trader is less profitable (E[πI ] ↓), and noise traders lose more (E[πN ] ↓).
Only fast traders’ aggregate profit is higher (E[πF ] ↑).
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Proof. Follows from Proposition 1.5.3.
Figure 1.9 illustrates the effect of fast traders’ information quality ρ and the
speed friction γ on market liquidity. When fast traders levy a higher speed tax rate
ργ on market makers’ price impact revenue E[λTy2], market makers raise temporary
price impact λT so that they can still break even. As a result, it becomes harder for
the informed trader to extract rent based on the same information. Noise traders
face less adverse selection because the informed trader trades less. Nonetheless noise
traders suffer more losses to trade the same number of shares. Effectively, noise
traders must pay information rent to the informed trader and speed rent to the fast
trader. The reduction in information rent is not enough to cover the higher speed
rent. Hence, the market is less liquid for the informed and noise traders.
We can also look at the impact of fast trading from a tax incidence perspective.
As discussed earlier, fast trading effectively impose a speed tax on market makers’
price impact revenue. In the model market makers’ demand is the most elastic and
noise traders’ demand is the least elastic. Thus the burden of the tax is paid mostly
by the noise traders, less so by the informed trader, and not by market makers.
Do fast traders provide liquidity? Based on the way they trade, it might seem
that they do. Fast traders “take liquidity” during time (t1, 1) when liquidity is cheap
and “provide liquidity” at time 1 to the informed and noise traders when liquidity
is expensive. One might do a reduced-form counter-factual analysis and find that
the price would have been much worse for the liquidity demanders if fast traders
were not trading at time 1. In the context of this paper, the conclusion is incorrect
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Figure 1.9: Equilibrium market liquidity.normalized by the volatility of fundamental
value σv and volatility of noise trading σz. Proposition 1.5.3 imply that equilibrium
liquidity is determined by ργ where ρ ∈ [0, 1] represents fast traders’ information quality
and γ ∈ [0, 1/3] represents the level of speed friction. The informed and noise traders’
expected profits are decreasing in ργ, whereas temporary price impact λT and fast traders’
total expected profits are increasing in ργ.
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because if fast traders were not present, the temporary price impact λT would have
been much lower. Liquidity demanders, including the informed and noise traders,
would have been better off without fast traders.
In sum, to improve market liquidity, one should try to lower fast traders’
information quality ρ and speed friction γ.
1.6 Policy discussion
Regardless of one’s desired balance of liquidity and price informativeness, when
front-running fast traders have a more informative signal ρ or when speed friction
γ is higher, the market quality is unambiguously worse: prices are less (ex post)
informative and liquidity is more costly. The only possible social value is a more
informative intermediate price which quickly becomes obsolete. Considering its short
life, it hardly improves social welfare.
When considering a potential policy about high frequency trading, one should
focus on gauging its impact on fast traders’ information precision ρ and speed friction
γ. A policy that reduces ργ is going to improve ex post price informativeness and
market liquidity.
Speed competitions
Reducing the entry cost to become a fast trader does not necessarily improve
market quality. Not all competitions are equal. One needs to carefully induce
Cournot competition and avoid Stackelberg competition among fast traders. When
fast traders engage in Cournot competition on quantities, increased competition
60
drives down their aggregate profit and enhance social welfare. When fast traders
engage in Stackelberg competition on speed, increased competition may not result in
lower aggregate front-running profits. Relative speed might only serve as a tiebreaker
among front-runners to split the front-running profits. Under the setting of this
paper, the aggregate front-running profit can even be higher when more front-runners
with different speed are present. At the very least, the possibility to competite on
speed weakens the competition on quantity or on price. It is puzzling to see that
existing markets typically have no limit on speed competition while imposing tick
size and minimum trade size to limit competition on price and quantity.
We may examine the effect of speed competition on market quality in Figure
1.10. The Cournot speed profile could be stable when the trading frequency (time
granularity) is not too high. In a market where time is almost continuous, the slightest
speed advantage counts. A fast trader has very strong incentive to develop and
invest in new speed technologies to shave every nanosecond off her latency. Existing
markets with high trading frequency are more likely to be close to the Stackelberg
bound where front-running traders’ profits are the highest, market liquidity is the
most expensive, and ex post information efficiency is the lowest.
Periodic batch auctions
A natural way to deter the arms race in speed is to convert a continuous market
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Figure 1.10: Market quality and speed competition. Fast traders information
precision ρ = 0.8. (a) Speed friction increases (decreases) with number of fast
traders if fast traders follow the Stackelberg-N (Cournont-N) speed profiles. (b)
Ex post price informativeness decreases (increases) with number of fast traders
if fast traders follow the Stackelberg-N (Cournont-N) speed profiles. (c) Total
fast trading profit increases (decreases) with number of fast traders if fast traders
follow the Stackelberg-N (Cournont-N) speed profiles. (d) Expected noise traders’
profits decrease (increases) with number of fast traders if fast traders follow the
Stackelberg-N (Cournont-N) speed profiles.
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to a periodic uniform price auctions market as proposed by Budish et al. (2013).25
Effectively, by eliminating the time priority of orders arriving withing a batching
interval, the periodic auction enforces a Cournot speed profile. Given the information
structure of this model, such a market design reduces the speed friction γ caused by
front-running fast traders.
The result of this paper could shed light on the choice of the optimal batching
interval ∆t. To be consistent with the model of this paper, suppose that at the
beginning of each batching interval, a pricing function is announced. Then, traders
are allowed to submit market orders. Orders are accumulated until time ∆t and
executed at the same price according to the pricing function.
The batching interval ∆t should be long but it does not need to be very long.
Once several fast traders fall into the same batching interval, knowing that they









where N is the number of fast traders in the same
batch. Figure 1.10 shows that the improvement on market quality is substantial when
∆t is long enough to batch the 5 fastest traders together. Considering the speed of
existing high frequency traders, a batching interval of 1 second would probably make
most of them barely profitable. The only cost is that we do not observe intermediate
price updates during the one second interval and some liquidity demanders need to
wait one second to fill their orders.
25 Goldman and Sosin (1979) show that when speculators have a convex payoff, they tend to
over speculate and cause price overshooting. Thus a market with finite trading frequency could
have more “efficient” prices than a continuous market because less price overshooting.
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Random order delays and latency floors
Recently, some trading venues have implemented innovative rules to curb the
speed advantage of high frequency traders. They relax the time priority rule in
various ways. In April 2013, a new foreign exchange trading platform ParFX adds
a 20-80 millisecond random delays to orders arriving at the matching engine; in
August, a major foreign exchange trading platform EBS introduced a “latency floor”
on trades of AUD/USD: orders are first bundled within one to three milliseconds
and then randomly placed in the queue.26
It might seem that these rules would have similar effects to those under periodic
batch auctions. Surprisingly, however, they are far less effective and when the random
delays or the latency floors are not long enough, these measures could even make
market quality worse than the Stackelberg case.
The random order delays or latency floors turn a deterministic speed advantage
into a random advantage. For the ParFX case, the fastest trader still has a speed
advantage in probability because other traders are also subject to random delays.
For the EBS case, each fast traders arrive during the same 1-3 millisecond interval
has the same probability of being the first. Let’s analyze the EBS’s floor latency as
an example.
Assume that N fast traders fall into the same batch and they all estimate that
the incoming order flow of the next batch is ŷ. EBS randomly shuffles their positions
in the queue so that each fast trader has a 1
N
probability of being placed at each
position j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ N . To be comparable with the previous results, suppose all
26 Retrieved from Reuters.com http://goo.gl/30SiwH
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fast traders exit together in the next batch when y arrives.27 We have the following
results.
Proposition 1.6.1 (Speed friction under the EBS latency floor). In a sym-
metric equilibrium where all N fast traders trade the same, each fast trader trades:
u = 2
N+3
ŷ and equivalent speed friction γ = 4N
(N+3)2
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(b) Speed friction γ
Figure 1.11: Speed friction and each fast trader’s order size under the EBS latency
floor rule.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 1.11. Under the latency floor rule,
speed friction is always higher than the Cournot case N
(N+1)2
for all N . When N ≤ 3,





27 Like before, a fast trader j could add −uj to the limit order book. In the next batch, the
order of y shares arrives and is executed at p1 = p0 + λ
T
∑
j uj + λ
T (y −∑j uj) = p0 + λT y.
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The impact of the latency floor rule on fast traders is subtle. On one hand, the
rule equalizes the speed of fast traders in the same batching interval in probability.
So each fast trader submits an order of the same size. On the other hand, unlike in
the periodic uniform price auctions, fast traders still receive different prices under
the latency floor rule.
Compared with the case in which all fast traders have deterministically different
speeds, the latency floor rule induces fast traders to choose different order sizes.
Under the latency floor rule, the fast trader who ends up being the first in the queue




). This leaves more
profits to the second and third fast traders. The fast trader who ends up being the






. Hence, the impact of the latency floor rule on the aggregate profits of
fast traders depends on the length of the randomizing interval.28
When the randomizing interval is short (N ≤ 3), the speed friction γ can even
be higher than the Stackelberg case. Although the first fast trader’s expected profit
is lower, the second and third fastest traders make more profits. As a result the total
profit for the top three fast traders are higher. Intuitively, when the randomizing
interval is short, the latency floor effectively turns a race to be the first into a race
to be the top three.
When the randomizing interval is long, the number of fast traders in the same
interval N increases. In the limit when N → ∞, the total fast trading volume
28 Under the latency floor rule, when fast traders collude, each fast trader chooses an order size




ŷ → 2ŷ. Fast traders who end up in the first half of the queue make
profits and fast traders in the second half of the queue suffer losses. Their profits and
losses almost cancel and speed friction γ converges to zero. The rate of convergence,
however, is much slower than under the uniform price periodic auction (Cournot), as
illustrated in the panel (b) of Figure 1.11.
In short, the well intentioned latency floor could worsen the market quality
when the randomizing interval is short. Even if the interval is long enough, market
quality under the latency floor is still worse than a market with uniform price batch
auctions.
Minimum order life time and order cancellation fee
Some high frequency traders cancel an excessively high fraction of the limit
orders they submit. For example, Gai et al. (2012) find that order cancella-
tion/execution ratio is around 30:1 on the NASDAQ exchange in two weeks of
year 2010. Although the motive of such behavior is not well understood,29 it consti-
tutes a cost to exchanges and raises concerns of manipulative strategies like “quote
stuffing”. Exchanges and regulators have been discussing and experimenting mea-
sures, such as a minimum order life and order cancellation fees, to curb the high
message volume.
In this paper, front-running HFTs are assumed to trade with market orders.
To fully understand the effect of these rules, we need a more complete model of both
29 Baruch and Glosten (2013) show that liquidity providers submit flickering quotes to play a
mixed strategy. Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) provide evidence suggesting that short-lived quotes are
used to search for latent liquidity.
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aggressive and passive HFTs, which is outside of the scope of this paper. I provide
some analysis based on the likely impact on the aggressive front-running HFTs.
First, between the two measures, a minimum order life time has the additional
drawback of creating more room for the front-running HFTs. It makes the temporary
price impact factor λT less flexible for longer durations. Second, reduced message
volume might improve the quality ρ of front-running fast traders’ information. With
fewer updates to the limit order book, front-runners potentially have less noise to
filter out and large trades become easier to detect. Third, liquidity providers would
need to demand high compensation for posting limit orders due to the higher direct
fees or the higher indirect speed tax levied by front-running HFTs. The extra cost is
shared among all market participants; traders whose demands are most inelastic pay
a higher fraction of the cost.
Hence, we could observe a less liquid market following the implementation of
such a rule as found by Malinova, Park and Riordan (2012). The effect could be
partially due to the heightened impact of aggressive front-running HFTs ex post.
1.7 Empirical implications
Empirical studies, for example Baron et al. (2012) and Hagströmer and Nordén
(2013), have revealed that HFTs use diverse strategies. This paper mainly models the
impact of front-running HFTs. It is an empirical challenge to identify front-runners.
Some HFTs initiate most of their trades rather than passively absorb others’ orders.
These HFTs are more likely to be front-runners. The empirical implications are
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likely to be more relevant for the aggressive HFTs than the passive ones. It should
be noted that front-running is not limited to aggressive traders; passive HFTs also
effectively front-run when they detect a large incoming order and cancel their limit
orders.
1.7.1 Market capacity
Prediction 1.7.1. In a continuous market, only a few front-running HFTs can
survive if they trade on the same order flow information.
Prediction 1.7.2. In a continuous market, the entry of a fastest front-running HFT
reduces trading volume and profits of all existing HFTs. It might not significantly
affect aggregate trading volume, aggregate HFT profits, or market quality if the
existing market is almost saturated.
In a continuous market, practically all traders have different speeds. As is
shown in panel (c) of Figure 1.10, the aggregate fast trading profit flattens out quickly
along the Stackelberg bound when all fast traders have different speeds. Considering
the high costs of staying relatively fast, only a very limited number of HFTs are
likely to make net profits.30
After the entry of a fastest front-running HFT, all existing HFTs drop one spot
in the rankings of relative speeds. They capture fewer shares at worse prices than
before. Thus their trading volume and profit decline. Because the market capacity
30 This prediction is contingent on the assumption that all front-runners have the same order
flow information. More HFTs can survive if they specialize in predicting different components of
the order flow.
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for front-running HFTs is limited, the entry of a faster HFT might simply crowd
out slower existing HFTs. The total trading volume and HFT profts are almost
unaffected by the entry. This is consistent with the findings of Breckenfelder (2013)
and Budish et al. (2013).
1.7.2 Market quality
Prediction 1.7.3. A new policy does not affect market quality significantly if it does
not change front-running HFTs’ information quality about the incoming order flow
or the heterogeneity of HFTs’ relative speeds.
Gai et al. (2012) find that after the NASDAQ reduces trading latency from
microsecond to nanosecond, there is no significant change in market quality. The
findings are consistent with my paper because such a reduction does not change
HFTs’ relative speeds, especially in the short run. The reduction could, however,
trigger a new round of socially wasteful investment in speed technology among HFTs
due to a finer time granularity.
Impact of technology shocks on speed friction γ could be difficult to determine.
Roughly speaking, speed friction increases with the heterogeneity of fast traders’
relative speeds. For example, introduction of co-location service could reduce speed
heterogeneity and thus reduces the speed friction γ. Without co-location service
provided by the exchange, HFTs rent rooms nearby the exchange to reduce latencies.
With co-location, all HFTs are able to place their computers in the same room.
Hence co-location could reduce the speed differences among HFTs and improve
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market quality. Boehmer et al. (2012) and Frino, Mollica and Webb (2013) find that
the introduction of co-location improves market liquidity.
1.7.3 Volatility, momentum, and reversal
Prediction 1.7.4 (Volatility). Other things equal, more severe HFT front-running
(ργ ↑) increases short-term volatility and reduces long-term volatility.
Prediction 1.7.5 (Momentum and reversal). Other things equal, more severe HFT
front-running (ργ ↑) causes stronger short-term momentum and reversal.
Front-running fast traders’ impact is higher when they have better information
ρ or when the speed friction γ is higher. Here, “more severe HFT front-running”
means that ργ is higher.
The two predictions are both related to the divergence of temporary price
impact λT and permanent price impact λP . The higher short-term price volatility is
caused by a higher temporary price impact λT . Long-term volatility, for example
volatility calculated with daily closing prices, is mainly determined by the permanent
price impact λP , which is determined by the trading intensity of the informed trader.
Faced with a higher price impact λT , the informed trader trades slower. Daily
volatility might not be affected when the informed trader finishes trading within a
day. In the long run, informed trader produces less information, resulting in lower
daily price volatilities.
Short run price momentum is caused by fast traders trading on the similar
information; short run price reversal is caused by the price adjustment after fast
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traders have exited. As illustrated in Figure 1.4, fast traders with different speeds
trade in the same direction and march along the supply curve of the steeper slope λT .
After they have exited, price reverse to the efficient level implied by the flatter slope
λP . Market makers amplify λT/λP when front-running traders extract more profits.






The magnitude increases with front-runners’ impact ργ and fundamental volatility
σ2v .
1.7.4 Trading volume
Proposition 1.7.1 (Trading volume). Suppose fast traders (HFT) exit with market
orders. Then,
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where Ω = 1−∏Ji=0(1− αi).
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Prediction 1.7.6. When there is more noise trading (σz ↑), the market becomes
more liquid (λT ↓), the informed trades more (β ↑), and HFTs initiate higher trading
volume (E[|SJ |] ↑).
The prediction is based on Theorem 1.3.1 and Proposition 1.7.1. The observed
positive correlation between HFT volume and market liquidity could be induced by
time varying levels of noise trading.
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Prediction 1.7.7. Keeping volatility of noise trading σz constant, normal-speed
traders initiate less volume when there is more front-running high frequency trading
(ργ ↑).
A higher total trading volume E[|y|+ 2|SJ |] does not mean that the market is
more liquid. Volume could be generated by intermediaries including HFTs. Other
things equal, volume initiated by long-term buy-side traders (proxy of E[|y|]), however,
is a good indicator of market liquidity.
Buy side liquidity demanders can monitor the costs of their own trades and
choose the trading venue in response to their trading costs. The increasing popularity
of dark pools among institutional traders suggests that trading on exchanges has
become expensive relative to trading in dark pools. Recently, Tong (2013) uses a
dataset on institutional trades and finds that HFTs increases the execution shortfalls
of traditional institutional traders.
Prediction 1.7.8. Keep the number of front-running high frequency traders and
their relative speeds fixed. The fraction of volume initiated by these high frequency
traders is determined by their information quality ρ.31
More specifically, if there are N front-runners. The fraction of volume initiated
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when N is reasonably large,
especially for the Stackelberg case.32 Empirically, we can use the ratio to back out
31 If HFTs are more risk averse than other investors, the ratio would be lower when HFTs’ risk
exposure is higher. See Appendix A.1.4.
32 For example, if 5 HFTs having different speeds are in the market, the entry of a new HFT
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fast traders’ information quality ρ in cross-section and in time series. For example,
Brogaard et al. (2013a) find that on days when the fastest co-located traders initiate
a larger fraction of the volume, market is less liquid. This finding is consistent with
my model prediction that front-running HFTs initiate a larger fraction of the volume
when they predict the order flow more accurately and this renders the market less
liquid.
Even when HFTs only have a very noisy signal about the order flow, they
could generate a high fraction of the trading volume. For example, let’s assume 5









)2 ≈ 0.05. It implies that the probability for fast traders to trade
in the right direction is 58%, only slightly higher than 50%.
1.7.5 Profits and inventory management
Prediction 1.7.9. Front-running HFTs’ profits increase with fundamental uncer-
tainty σv, noise trading σz, HFTs’ information quality ρ, and speed friction γ.
Prediction 1.7.10. Aggregate front-running HFTs’ profits represent a higher frac-
tion of noise traders’ implementation shortfall when front-running is more severe
(ργ ↑).












. If we use implementation shortfall to proxy the trading loss of noise




, then E[πF ]/E[−πN ] = 1−θ2. The effect of σvσz is canceled
with a different speed would barely change the ratio because 2−5 and 2−6 are too close.
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once we take the ratio. Empirically, we can use the ratio to measure the overall
impact of all front-running HFTs on market quality θ.
Prediction 1.7.11. Faster front-running HFTs tend to trade more shares, have
higher inventory levels, hold inventory for longer time periods, and make larger profit
per share.
The fastest HFTs do not necessarily trade more frequently. When trading
on similar signals, a higher speed allows an HFT to acquire more shares at better
prices. Larger inventory and longer holding horizons could result from better market
timings. Consistent with this prediction, Brogaard et al. (2013a) recently find that
after a subgroup of HFTs upgrade to the fastest co-location service, these HFTs
hold larger inventory for longer durations.
1.8 Conclusion
I analyze the implications of traders’ speed differences in a strategic model of
asymmetrically informed traders. In this model, front-running HFTs use their speed
advantage to extract rents from normal-speed traders and the extracted rents are
allocated among HFTs according their relative speeds.
A higher trading frequency makes it less likely for HFTs to compete on quantity
and more likely to compete on speed. Unlike price or quantity competitions, speed
competition may not benefit normal-speed traders. Even when infinitely many front-
running HFTs compete against one another on speed, their negative market impact
in general does not vanish because the fastest HFTs still make positive profits. At
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the very least, higher trading frequency weakens the effectiveness of pro-competition
policies designed to mitigate the negative impact of HFTs.
We already limit competition on price and quantity by imposing rules of the
minimum price variation (one tick) and the minimum quantity variation (one share).
Findings of this paper suggest that imposing an upper limit on trading frequency is
equally, if not more, justifiable because such a limit would deter the socially wasteful
competition on speed.
Inevitably, I have made simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless, the key results
seem to be robust in more general settings. First, speeds are exogenous in the paper.
When speed is costly, a higher granularity of time would still encourage investment
in speed because being relatively faster generates high payoffs.
Second, I assume that each fast trader can only trade twice in each trading
round. As a result, only relative speed matters. If a fast trader can trade multiple
times before the next fast trader arrives, both absolute and relative speed differences
would affect their profits. The faster one would have more trading opportunities in
addition to the advantage of trading earlier. In the limit when the fastest trader can
trade infinitely many times before the second fastest trader, only the fastest makes
positive profits. Nevertheless, lowering the trading frequency can still reduce the
aggregate front-running profits because it reduces the number of trading opportunities
of the fastest front-runners.
Finally, this paper focuses on the front-running HFTs. Many other HFT
strategies can have benign or beneficial effects on the market. It seems, however, that
lowering the frequency of trading would also help many liquidity enhancing HFTs
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because they could spend less resource on protecting themselves against front-runners.
A lower trading frequency, of course, has its drawbacks. For example, the
noise traders would have to wait longer before their liquidity demands are met. In
addition, in the next Chapter, I show that a higher trading frequency enables the
patient informed traders to lower their price impact and extract more profits from
their private information. The results of this paper suggest that a higher trading
frequency is not always socially beneficial. Policy makers need to carefully weigh the
costs and benefits of imposing no limit on the frequency of trading.
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Chapter 2: The Fast and the Faster: Trading Frequency and Market
Quality
2.1 Introduction
Financial markets have undergone considerable changes in recent years. In
particular, many securities are being traded almost continuously. In this paper,
I investigate the impact of higher trading frequencies on the quality of financial
markets.
First, I develop a dynamic model in which traders with different trading motives
interact. All traders act at the same frequency. Using a variant of the dynamic model
of Kyle (1985), I show that when trading frequency is higher, prices become more
informative. The informed trader produces more private information and trades
more aggressively. As a result, the market incorporates more information faster.
I also find that when the trading frequency is higher, market is less liquid in the
beginning but the illiquidity decays more quickly because the information asymmetry
decays faster. Overall, a higher trading frequency benefits the informed trader and
leads noise traders to lose more.
Second, I extend the benchmark model to include high frequency traders
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(HFTs) who anticipate other traders’ order flow and quickly trade to profit from the
order flow information. I embed HFT front-runners as modeled in the first chapter
of this dissertation. When the trading frequency is finite, I show that a higher HFT
intensity reduces price efficiency and market liquidity. The informed trader trades
more slowly and market prices incorporate his private information less quickly. Such
negative impact of HFT on price efficiency decreases with the expected lifetime of
the private information. An informed trader with long-lived private information is
less affected by HFTs.
Third, I show that when the trading frequency goes to infinity, the impact of
HFTs on the informed trader vanishes. The informed trader trades in the same way
and makes the same amount of profits for any HFT intensity. Consequently, price
efficiency is unaffected by HFTs in the continuous time limit. HFT front-runners
make all their profits from noise traders who demand immediacy.
2.2 Trading game
In this section, trading is modeled as a dynamic game in which traders with
different trading motives interact. In the benchmark model, everyone operates at
the same frequency. The time interval between two adjacent trading opportunities is
∆t. As ∆t decreases, everyone acts at a higher and equal frequency. In the limit, as
∆t → 0, trading can be approximated by a continuous time game. In the extended
model, I add HFTs who act at a higher frequency than other traders.
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2.2.1 Model setup
2.2.1.1 Assets and agents
Two assets are traded. The risk free asset has a fixed value of 1. The risky
asset’s fundamental value v is normally distributed as
v ∼ N (0, σ2v) (2.2.1)
The distribution and volatility σv of v are common knowledge to all agents.
Three types of risk neutral agents anonymously trade in the market: (1) One
informed trader has monopolistic access to a costly technology that can generate
private information about v. The informed trader’s time discount factor equals the
risk free rate 0.1 (2) A continuum of noise traders trade for liquidity reasons that are
unrelated to fundamentals of the risky asset. They demand immediate execution.2
(3) A continuum of perfectly competitive risk neutral market makers set prices and
absorb the net order flow imbalance coming from other traders.3
1 The model can be extended such that the informed trader’s time discount factor is greater
than the risk free rate. It represents the impatience of the monopolistic informed trader and may
be due to his higher cost of capital or margin requirement. The informed trader would then choose
to produce information that decays at the same rate as his discount factor.
2 Noise traders demand immediacy at the cost of expected trading losses. The losses may be
offset by gains outside of the trading game.
3 Risk sharing motives are not modeled explicitly. We can consider the risk neutrality of market
makers as a good approximation when many market makers compete to absorb a very small amount
of risk transferred in each transaction.
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2.2.1.2 Timeline
The game starts at time 0 when the monopolistic informed trader chooses an
observable level of accuracy of his signal and produces private information about the
risky asset’s value v.
Starting from time ∆t, periodic batch auctions are held and the time interval
between any two adjacent auctions is ∆t. The first trade occurs at ∆t. The fair
value v is revealed to the public at a random time T . At time T , the game ends. All
traders liquidate their positions at the fair price v.
Right before time n∆t, the inventory of the informed trader is xn−1, the
aggregate inventory of all noise traders is zn−1, and the cumulative shares sold by
the market makers is yn−1. The initial inventories of all traders are zero (x0 = y0 =
z0 = 0).
At time n∆t, if news has not been announced (T > n∆t), the informed
traders submit an order of ∆xn = xn−xn−1 shares, the noise trader submit orders of
∆zn = zn−zn−1 shares, and the market makers set a price pn and sell ∆yn = yn−yn−1
shares. The market clearing condition requires that
∆yn = ∆xn + ∆zn. (2.2.2)
Noise traders’ order flow follows the process
∆zn = zn − zn−1 = σz(Bn∆t −B(n−1)∆t) (2.2.3)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion independent from the risky asset’s funda-
mental value v. The volatility σz is common knowledge to all agents.
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The announcement time T is exponentially distributed with probability density
function as follows
fT (t) = ηe
−ηt, t ≥ 0 (2.2.4)
At any trading time n∆t before the public announcement T , it is possible that the
risky asset’s value v is announced in the interval T ∈ (n∆t, (n+ 1)∆t] such that the
game ends before time (n+ 1)∆t and all traders liquidate their positions at the price
of pT = v. The probability of this event is
Pr {T < (n+ 1)∆t|T > n∆t} = 1− e−η∆t (2.2.5)
The expected lifetime of the informed trader’s signal is E[T ] = 1/η. A longer
lived information has a smaller information arrival rate η. For a given η, the
likelihood of news announcement occuring in the next interval η∆t is lower when
trading frequency 1/∆t is higher
This paper investigates the impact of trading frequency, lifetime of private
information, and front-running HFTs on the quality of the financial market.
2.2.1.3 Information
The informed trader produces one noisy signal Iv about the fundamental value
v only at time 0. The precision of this signal is observable but the realization Iv is
private information to the informed trader. No further information is produced after
time 0. Starting from time ∆t, the informed trader trades on this signal until time
T when the fair value v is revealed to the public. It is common knowledge that the
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signal Iv satisfies
Iv = v + e, e ∼ N (0, σ2e) (2.2.6)
The Gaussian noise term e is independent from v. Quality of the informed trader’s








ρi is in bounded in [0, 1]. A more informative signal Iv has a larger ρi. When ρi = 0,
the signal is entirely noise; when ρi = 1, the signal equals v with probability 1. From








= (1− ρi)σ2v (2.2.9)
It is assumed that information production is observable and thus the market makers
do not need to estimate the informed trader’s information quality ρi. Knowing ρi
does not eliminate the adverse selection problem because the signal Iv is private to
the informed trader and trading is anonymous.4
Price history {pn} is public information. The informed trader observes the
signal Iv and his own inventory history {xn}. In equilibrium, due to the monotonicity
of the pricing rule, the informed trader can also perfectly infer the history of the noise
4 The informed trader possibly has an incentive to hide his information production effort so that
the market makers may underestimate ρi. There may be a “forecast the forecasts of others” problem
because the informed trader then has to estimate the market makers’ estimate of ρi. Extending the
model to allow for hidden information production can be explored in the future.
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trades {zn}. Denote the expectation taken over the informed trader’s information
set by
EIn [·] = E
[
·
∣∣Iv, xn,F {{pm, xm}0≤m<n}] (2.2.10)
where F {·} is the σ-algebra generator. Notice that at time n∆t, the informed trader
does not observe price pn and liquidity trades zn.
The market makers observe price history {pn} and the order flow imbalance
process {yn = xn + zn}. Because trading is anonymous, market makers cannot
differentiate informed trading xn and liquidity demand zn. Denote the expectation
taken over the market makers’ information by
EMn [·] = E
[
·
∣∣yn,F {{pm, ym}0≤m<n}] (2.2.11)
where F {·} is the σ-algebra generator. The market makers set the price pn conditional
on their information set. The degree of information asymmetry between the informed




2.2.2 Trading with equal frequency
From the informed trader’s perspective, this is a two stage game. (1) In the
information production stage, he chooses the quality of information ρi and produce
a signal Iv with quality ρi. (2) In the trading stage, he choose a trading strategy to
maximize his expected trading profit conditioning on the signal Iv. The two stages
are separable because once trading starts the informed trader receives no additional
information.
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In this section I solve the trading game after the informed trader has chosen
the quality ρi of the signal Iv. As introduced before, market makers observes the
quality of the informed trader’s signal ρi but not the signal Iv itself. The informed
trader’s estimate of the liquidation value v is
v̂ = E[v|Iv] = ρiIv (2.2.13)
2.2.2.1 Continuous time trading
To provide some intuition, let’s first examine the limiting case where interval
between trades ∆t converges to 0 and assets are traded in continuous time. Nota-
tions are adapted accordingly. The expectation taken with respect to the insider’s
information and market makers’ information are
EIt [·] = E
[
·
∣∣Iv, xt,F {{xs, ps}s<t}] (2.2.14)
EMt [·] = E
[
·
∣∣yt,F {{ys, ps}s<t}] (2.2.15)
and the informed trader’s perceived pricing error of the market price pt− is
Dt = v̂ − pt− . (2.2.16)
Magnitude of Dt reflects the advantage of the informed over the public information.




At time t, the informed trades dxt shares, the noise traders dzt shares, and
the market makers clear the market at price pt after observing the aggregate order
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dxt + dzt. In equilibrium, market price is semi-strong efficiency and the informed
maximize expected current and aggregate future profits. I assume that the informed
trader’s value function exists and it is defined as follows:









In this paper, I only consider the linear equilibrium as defined below.
Definition 2.2.1 (Continuous time trading game equilibrium). The informed trader
and market makers follow strategies characterized by βt and λt:
5
Informed’s trade size: dxt = βtdt (2.2.19)
Price updating rule: dpt = λt(dxt + dzt) (2.2.20)







In equilibrium, prices are semi-strong form efficient and the informed trader maximizes
5 In the conjectured equilibrium, informed order flow dxt has no diffusion term. Back (1992)
proves it’s not optimal for the insider order flow to have a diffusion term even when the insider can
effectively observe the noise trading in the continuous trading limit. In Foucault et al. (2012) high
frequency news traders’ (HFNT) order flow does have a Brownian motion term. It comes from
a piece of information that is going to expired at the next instant and thus HFNT trades very
aggressively despite the high price impact. The trading game is essentially a repeated static game
of the Kyle (1985) model. The intuition is similar to Chau and Vayanos (2008) and Li (2013).
6 The constraint rules out the doubling strategies as in Back and Baruch (2004).
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expected aggregate trading profits from time t on
pt = E
M




































t [v̂] = ρiσ
2
ve
−2ηt, t ≥ 0 (2.2.26)


















σvσz, t ≥ 0 (2.2.27)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
As pointed out by Back (1992), there are in general multiple optima for the
informed trader in the continuous time limit. When price impact λt is set as above,
the informed trader can achieve maximum expected profits with multiple trading
strategies. For example, an alternative expression of the value function is











The first term is the profit of pushing price to equal v̂ at time t; the second term is
the noise traders’ expected loss from time t+ to the ending time T when the informed
trader follows the given equilibrium strategy from t+ on.
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So informed trader’s trading intensity βt cannot be uniquely determined. The
above equilibrium is chosen such that the market makers’ belief updating is correct
at any time instant t not only over the interval [0, T ]. This equilibrium refinement
implies that the continuous equilibrium is an approximation of the discrete time
reality where ∆t is small yet still strictly positive.
Corollary 2.2.2. [Equilibrium properties of βt, λt, and Σt] Price impact λt and




The expected pricing error EMt [Dt] = E
M
t [v̂ − pt] and the information asymmetry
measured in variance Σt = Var
M

























Key feature of the equilibrium is that the price impact factor λt decays expo-
nentially, unlike in the continuous time model of Kyle (1985) where λt is constant. In
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this model, the informed trader is faced with the risk that their private information
may expire at the next instant with probability e−ηdt. Hence, the informed trader
trades more when he still can. He does not trade away all his information in one
trade because the price impact is lower at the next time instant.
Since the noise traders do not change their trading intensity σz, the fraction of
volume initiated by the informed trader is higher in early trading periods. Hence,
market makers learn more and the information asymmetry reduces by more (2ηΣt)
in early trading periods when Σt is higher.
2.2.2.2 Market quality of the continous time equilibrium
Market liquidity and information efficiency are two important measures of the
quality of a financial market. In this paper, market liquidity is measured by the
price impact factor λt and information efficiency is measured by the level of residual
information asymmetry Σt = Var
M
t [v̂]. Market is more liquid when price impact λt
is lower and prices are more informationally efficient if Σt is lower.
Several factors given in the following proposition only affect the initial market
quality, captured by λ0 and Σ0, when trading starts at time 0.
Proposition 2.2.3. [Effect of σz,σv, and ρi] Initial price impact λ0 is higher when
there is more total fundamental uncertainty (σv ↑), the informed trader’s information
is more accurate (ρi ↑), or there is less noise trading (σz ↓). Initial information
asymmetry is higher (Σ0 ↑) when there is more total fundamental uncertainty (σv ↑)
or the informed trader’s information is more accurate (ρi ↑).
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Proof. Follows from Corollary 2.2.2.
In the continuous time equilibrium, the only parameter that affects the dynamics
of the equilibrium is η, the arrival rate of the public information. The public news
announcement follows a Poisson arrival process. Due to the memoryless property
of Poisson process, at each instant, the game is essentially the same after proper
normalization. For the informed trader, the only relevant state variable is Dt/λt, the
number of shares one can trade to drive the pricing error Dt to zero. In equilibrium,
the informed trader trades a fraction 2ηdt of Dt/λt at every instant. As a result, the
pricing error Dt on average is reduced by a fixed fraction 2ηdt. The price impact
factor λt is also reduced by a fixed fraction ηdt.
Proposition 2.2.4 (Effect of lifetime of private information 1/η). When the
public news arrives faster (η ↑) or equivalently the expected lifetime of the private
information is shorter (1/η ↓), the informed trader trades away a higher fraction of
the residual information ( βtdt
Dt/λt
↑). Consequently,
1. the initial market liquidity is worse (λ0 ↑) but the speed of liquidity improvement
is higher (−dλt/λt ↑);
2. the initial information asymmetry (Σ0) is unchanged and the speed of informa-
tion revelation through prices is faster (−dΣt/Σt ↑).
Proof. Follows from Corollary 2.2.2.
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Figure 2.1: Dynamics of price impact λt and public information arrival rate η
Figure 2.2: Dynamics of information asymmetry Σt and public information arrival
rate η
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Arrival speed of the public news (η), or equivalently the expected lifetime of
the informed trader’s private information (1/η), has ambiguous effect on market
liquidity as illustrated in Figure 2.1. An important observation is that η affects both
the initial price impact factor λ0 and the speed of the decay of price impact dλt/λt.
When the public information arrives faster and the expected lifetime of the private
information is shorter (η ↑), the initial price impact λ0 is higher and its speed of
decay ηdt is also higher. Intuitively, when private information expires faster (η ↑),
the informed trader chooses to trade more aggressively at the beginning. Hence,
market is less liquid initially (λ0 ↑) due to higher intensity of informed trader.
On the other hand, a faster arrival rate of public news (η ↑) improves in-
formation efficiency of market prices as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The variance
Σn = Var
M
t [v̂] measures the information asymmetry between the informed trader and
the market maker. Its initial value Σ0 is determined by the amount of information
the informed trader choose to produce and is unaffected η. Its rate of decay −Σt/Σt,
however, is higher when the informed trades more aggressively (ηdt ↑). Hence, the
residual information asymmetry Σt is lower at any time t when public information
arrives faster (η ↑).
2.2.2.3 Discrete time trading
The continuous time equilibrium illustrates the impact of expected lifetime of a
private information (1/η) when the trading frequency is infinitely high. This section
investigates the discrete time trading game where trading frequency 1/∆t is finite.
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Right before time n∆t, the informed trader believes that the error of the last
traded price is
Dn = v̂ − pn−1. (2.2.33)
Since the news announcement time T is exponentially distributed, the conditional
probability of T occurring in the next ∆t interval is time invariant and always equals
1− exp(−η∆t).
In this paper, I consider linear equilibrium of the following form
∆xn = xn − xn−1 =
Dn
λn
· β∆t, β∆t ∈ [0, 1] (2.2.34)
∆pn = pn − pn−1 = λn(∆xn + ∆zn) = λn∆yn (2.2.35)
In the continuous time equilibrium, dxt
Dt/λt
= βdt is time-invariant. Hence, I conjecture
that in the discrete time equilibrium ∆xn
Dn/λn
is also time invariant. β∆t is bounded in
[0, 1] so that the informed trader does not expected to incur losses in each trade.7
Given the linearity of the informed trader’s strategy and the normality of the random
variables, the market makers’ pricing rule is also linear.
Given such a conjectured equilibrium, at the beginning of each interval, the
structure of the game is essentially the same after proper normalization. The only
difference to the informed trader is Dn
λn
, which measures the expected number of
shares he can submit to push the execution price to v̂.
The informed trader’s expected terminal profit from trading from time n∆t to
7 I do not rule out the possibility of other forms of equilibria.
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the news announcement time T is









c equals the smallest integer no less than T
∆t
.
Definition 2.2.2. A linear equilibrium of the trading game is defined as a pair of β
and {λn} such that the two following conditions hold.





0 n = 0
pn−1 + λn(∆xn + ∆zn) n > 0
(2.2.37)
2. Profit maximization. For given {λn}, β is chosen such that
EIn [Π(β, n,Dn)] ≥ EIn [Π(β′, n,Dn)] ∀β′ (2.2.38)
The semi-strong market efficiency condition is natural given the assumption
of a continuum of perfectly competitive market makers.8 It implies that both the
returns and the order flows are unpredictable based only on the public information.
EMn−1[∆pn] = E
M
n−1[pn]− pn−1 = EMn−1[EMn [v]]− EMn−1[v] = 0 (2.2.39)














n−1[v̂ − pn−1] = 0 (2.2.40)
Hence, {pn} and {yn} are martingales adapted to the information set of the market
makers. The profit maximization condition is forward looking. It ensures that trade
8 Bernhardt and Hughson (1997), Guo and Kyle (2009), and Liu and Wang (2010) relax the
assumption of perfectly competitive risk neutral Bertrand market makers in different ways.
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at any instant optimally balance the instantaneous expected profit and the impact
to all subsequent periods.
Assume that there exists an optimal strategy {xn} for the informed trader.
Definition 2.2.3 (Value function of the informed trader). The informed trader
trades optimally in the time interval of [n∆t, T ) and the expected profit equals







Theorem 2.2.5 (Continuous time trading game equilibrium). There exists an
equilibrium where the equilibrium trading intensity β∆t ∈ [0, 1/2] is the unique













λn = λ0 · (1− β∆t)n/2 (2.2.43)





and the informed trader’s value function at time n∆t is












Σn = Σ0 · (1− β∆t)n, n ≥ 1. (2.2.47)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Theorem 2.2.6. As trading frequency goes to infinity (∆t → 0), the discrete time
equilibrium of Theorem 2.2.5 converges to the continuous time equilibrium of Theorem
2.2.1.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The discrete time equilibrium is characterized by β, which is determined by
the public information arrival rate η and inter-trade interval length ∆t. Specifically,
(1) the decaying speeds of price impact λn and information asymmetry Σn are
determined by β∆t and (2) the initial price impact λ0 depends on β. The following
result summarizes the effects of public news arrival rate η and duration between
trades ∆t.
Proposition 2.2.7. The probability of public news announcement in the next ∆t
interval equals 1− e−η∆t. Equation (2.2.41) defines a function g(·) implicitly such
that
β∆t = g(1− e−η∆t), η,∆t ≥ 0. (2.2.48)
Then, the function g(·) is increasing and concave (g′(·) > 0 and g′′(·) < 0) when







> 0 and ∂β
∂∆t
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
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2.2.2.4 Market quality of the discrete time equilibrium
Similar to Section 2.2.2.2, the quality of the market in a discrete time setting
is also captured by the price impact factor λn and information asymmetry Σn. As
in Proposition 2.2.3 of the continuous time game, the levels of the fundamental
uncertainty σv, noise trading σz, and the informed trader’s information production
ρi only affect the initial market liquidity and information efficiency.
Proposition 2.2.8. [Effect of σz,σv, and ρi] Initial price impact λ0 is higher when
there is more total fundamental uncertainty (σv ↑), the informed trader’s information
is more accurate (ρi ↑), or there is less noise trading (σz ↓). Initial information
asymmetry is higher (Σ0 ↑) when there is more total fundamental uncertainty (σv ↑)
or the informed trader’s information is more accurate (ρi ↑).
Proof. Follows from Theorem 2.2.5.
The dynamics of equilibrium is reflected by the speeds of decay of price impact
λn and information asymmetry Σn. In the continuous time, the arrival speed of
public news η determines these speeds. In the discrete time, the trading frequency
1/∆t also affects the dynamics of the equilibrium.
In a discrete time game, we need to measure the speed of decay carefully. For
example, when we reduce ∆t, the number of trades per unit of time increases. Hennce
the information asymmetry Σn decays less per trade but decays more per unit time.
The speed of decay per unit of time is captured by the parameter’s half-life.
Definition 2.2.4 (Half life of information asymmetry Σn and price impact λn). Half
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and half life of











Proposition 2.2.9. [Effect of η and ∆t on half-life of information asymmetry Σn
and illiquidity λn] When public information arrives faster (η ↑) or when trading
frequency increases ( 1
∆t
↑), information asymmetry Σn and price impact λn decay













> 0 for β∆t ∈ [0, 1/2] and ∆t > 0. In the continuous limit as
∆t → 0, T λ = 2TΣ = log 2η ≈ 0.69 E[T ].
Proof. * See Appendix B.5.
Proposition 2.2.10 (Effect of lifetime of private information 1/η on liquidity and
efficiency). When the lifetime of the private information is shorter ( 1
η
↓), initial
price impact is higher (λ0 ↑), initial information asymmetry (Σ0) is unchanged, price
impact and information asymmetry decay faster per trade (1− β∆t) ↓ and per unit
of time (T λ ↓ and TΣ ↓).
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.2.7 and Proposition 2.2.9.
The effects of η here are similar to its effects in the continuous time limit.
Proposition 2.2.11 (Effect of trading frequency 1/∆t on liquidity and effi-
ciency). When trading frequency is higher ( 1
∆t
↑) and time duration between trades
is lower (∆t ↓), initial price impact is higher (λ0 ↑), initial information asymmetry
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(Σ0) is unchanged, price impact and information asymmetry decay less per trade
(1− β∆t) ↑ and decay more per unit of time (T λ ↓ and TΣ ↓).
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.2.7 and Proposition 2.2.9.
The effect of trading frequency 1/∆t on liquidity is illustrated in Figure 2.3. A
higher trading frequency results in a higher initial price impact λ0, a slower decay
of λn per trade, and a faster decay of λn per unit of time. Intuitively, when the
informed trader has more trading opportunity, he can extract more profits from
the price deviation generated by the randomly arrived noise trades. Market makers
initially set a higher price impact λ0 so that they can offset the increased loss to the
informed trader. Although the informed trades less in each round and reveals less
information, he reveals more information per unit of time because he trades more
often.
A higher trading frequency 1/∆t does not affect the initial information asym-
metry (Σ0) and improves the speed of information revelation through prices. The
effect is illustrated in Figure 2.4 in which the expected public information arrival
time is E[T ] = 1/η = 5. By the time t = 4, about 80% of the private information is
revealed if ∆t = 0.01, and about 60% of the private information is revealed if ∆t = 1.
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Figure 2.3: Price impact λt for different ∆t when expected lifetime of the private
information is E[T ] = 1/η = 5.
Figure 2.4: Information asymmetry Σt for different ∆t when expected lifetime of
the private information E[T ] = 1/η = 5.
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2.3 Trading with high frequency traders
In the benchmark model of last section, we investigate the impact of trading
frequency on the financial market when every trader acts at the same trading
frequency.
High frequency traders (HFT), however, are generally perceived as those who
can trade and quote much faster than others. HFTs use a variety of strategies and
this paper does not attempt to be comprehensive. In this section, I extend the
benchmark model to include HFTs as modeled in Chapter 1.
HFTs in this paper, as in Chapter 1, use their speed advantage and advance
information of others’ order flow to front-run slower traders. To be more specific, I
assume that HFTs anticipate the incoming order flow within a small time window.
They cannot differentiate informed trading ∆xn from noise trading ∆zn. HFTs only
have noisy information about the size of the total incoming order of ∆yn = ∆xn+∆zn.
The continuum of market makers in aggregate effectively runs a market with the
pricing rule ∆pn = λn∆yn. HFTs first trades in the same direction of ∆yn and then
reverses the trade.
The net effect of HFTs on other traders is captured by the divergence of
temporary price impact λ̂ and permanent price impact λ. When the informed and
noise traders trade, they pay the temporary price impact λ̂; market makers, however,
only update prices with permanent price impact λ. The temporary price impact λ̂
is higher than the permanent price impact λ such that the market makers can still
break even when HFTs are present. For example, when buying ∆yn shares, liquidity
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demanders pay the price of pn−1 + λ̂n∆yn per share while the market makers set the
end of period price as pn−1 + λn∆yn. HFTs make low risk profits in a small time
window around every trading instant. They cannot, however, compound the profits
because the capacity of their strategy is limited by the liquidity demander’s trading
volume.
Definition 2.3.1 (HFT Intensity). HFT intensity ξn is defined as the amplifying





As is shown in Chapter 1, ξn is determined by the quality of HFTs’ information
ρ and the degree of their competition γ. Assume that ρ and γ are constant over
time, then the HFT intensity is also constant and9
ξ := ξn ∈ [0, 1] (2.3.2)
Here HFT intensity ξ is exogenously given. It can be endogenous when we know
the costs functions of HFTs’ information and speed. A more complete model would
consider the HFTs’ technology, capital constraint, risk aversion, information precision,
and belief about the market condition. A given ξ can be think of an equilibrium
level resulting from the complete model.
Definition 2.3.2. A linear equilibrium of the trading game with HFT is a pair of
informed trading intensity β̂ and market makers’ price updating rule λ̂n satisfying







1−ργ where ρ ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 0.5].
Therefore, ξ = λ
T
λP












(v − pi−1 − (1 + ξ)λ̂i)∆xi





Theorem 2.3.1. [Equilibrium with HFTs] There exists a linear equilibrium where
the informed trading intensity β̂ is the solution to the equation
e−η∆t =
1− 2β̂(1 + ξ)∆t√
1− β̂∆t(1− β̂(1 + 2ξ)∆t)
(2.3.4)





. In addition, for n ≥ 0,




Information asymmetry: Σn = ρiσ
2
v(1− β̂∆t)n (2.3.6)








Temporary price impact: λ̂n = (1 + ξ)λn (2.3.8)
And the informed trader’s value function is













Proof. See Appendix B.6.
When HFT intensity ξ = 0, the equilibrium reduces to the discrete time
equilibrium of Theorem 2.2.5.
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Corollary 2.3.2. Let β̂∆t = ĝ(η∆t). Then, ĝ(·) > 0 and ĝ′′(·) < 0. We can also





< 0, and ∂β̂
∂ξ
< 0.
Proof. Omitted. See Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6.
Corollary 2.3.3. The half life of information asymmetry Σt and price impact λt is
increasing in HFT intensity ξ.
Proof. It follows directly from ∂β̂
∂ξ
< 0 and the Theorem 2.3.1.
Figure 2.5: β∆t as a function of η∆t and HFT intensity ξ
In the discrete time equilibrium, when HFT intensity is higher (ξ ↑), the
informed agent trade less β∆t on given information advantage Dn/λn. As a result,
the market learns about the private information slower and the illiquidity decays
slower.
HFTs do not affect all informed traders equally. Figure 2.6 illustrates that the
impact of HFTs on informed traders is lower when the private information has a
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Figure 2.6: Informed trading intensity β as a function of HFT intensity ξ and public
news arrival rate η
longer expected lifetime (E[T ] = 1/η ↑). When η = 0.1, the expected number of
trading opportunity is E[T ]/∆t = 100. The informed’s trading intensity β is almost
unaffected by HFT intensity ξ. By contrast, when η = 2 and the informed expects to
trade E[T ]/∆t = 5 times, informed trading intensity is significantly mitigated when
HFT intensity ξ is higher.
Figure 2.7 illustrates this more clearly. As is shown in the figure, as the




↑), the effect of HFT
on the trading intensity of the informed trader is reduced.
Keep the lifetime of information η fixed. The impact of HFT on the informed
trader can also be reduced when the trading frequency is increased (∆t ↓). In fact,
the following theorem result shows that in the continuous time limit when ∆t → 0,
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Figure 2.7: Impact of HFT on informed trading intensity
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informed trader’s trading intensity β becomes independent of HFT intensity ξ.
Proposition 2.3.4 (Continuous time limit informed trading). In the limit when








Proof. See Appendix B.7.
Corollary 2.3.5 (Market quality in the continuous time limit with HFTs). In the
continuous time limit when ∆t → 0, the information efficiency Σt and the permanent
price impact λt are unaffected by HFT intensity ξ. The temporary price impact
λ̂t = (1 + ξ)λt.
We see that the impact of HFT front-running on the informed trader vanishes
as trading frequency goes to infinity. The informed trader trades in exactly the same
way as if there is no HFT. His value function is also exactly the same regardless
of the level of HFT intensity ξ. This result might seem contradictory because the
informed pays a higher price impact λ̂t = (1 + ξ)λt when HFT ξ is positive. Yet this
higher cost of trading has no impact on the informed trader’s strategy or his profits.
The result is due to the fact that the informed trader perfectly smooth out
his trades in the continuous time limit. As long as his information has a positive
expected lifetime η <∞, in the continuous time limit, the informed trader expects
to have infinitely many trading opportunities ( 1
ηdt
→∞). At any time instant, the
informed’s order size has the magnitude of dt while the noise traders’ order size has
the magnitude of
√
dt. Thus, the fraction of volume from the informed at any instant
is zero. The price change dpt is completely driven by noise trading dzt.
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Noise traders also trade the same amount for any HFT intensity ξ. Hence, the
information content of the order flow is thus the same regardless of the intensity of
HFT ξ. Market makers use the same permanent price impact factor λt to update
the prices from period to period.
Note that the informed trader chooses trading size dxt based on the permanent
price impact λt rather than the temporary price impact λ̂t. This suggests that in the
continuous time limit, the informed trader maximizes his trading profits when he
chooses the optimal rate to use his information. Although the actual price impact
costs λ̂t is affected by HFT intensity ξ, the rate of information decay is not. From
this perspective, this result resonates the original Kyle (1985) model where the
informed trades trades away the same amount of information no matter how higher
is σv/σz.
Noise traders suffer extra losses because they do not smooth out their trades
and pay a higher price impact cost λ̂t = (1 + ξ)λt when HFT intensity ξ is higher.
Noise traders’ extra losses equal exactly the profits made by the HFTs. The informed
trader is indifferent.
Result in this section suggests that in the current market where trading
frequency is extremely high, HFTs are effectively collecting a “transaction tax” from
noise traders who cannot smooth out their trades. For the informed trader who
can perfectly smooth out his trading, the impact of such front-running HFTs with
extremely short holding horizons is minimal.
Information efficiency of prices is unaffected in the continuous time limit because
the informed is not affected. Hence, a higher trading frequency tends to encourage
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production of information, especially short-run information, even when there are
front-runners.
Once information production is costly and trading frequency is finite, HFTs
would tend to reduce the information efficiency of prices since HFTs reduces the
marginal profit of information production. The effects of endogenous information
production is explored in Appendix B.8.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that a higher trading frequency has mixed effects on the
financial market.
First, when all traders share the same trading frequency, the market price is
unambiguously more informative. The informed trader’s private information gets
revealed faster and the informed trader is encouraged to produce more information.
The impact of a higher trading frequency on liquidity, however, is less clear. The
market is less liquid in the beginning but the illiquidity decays faster. The total
trading losses of the liquidity driven noise traders are higher. Effectively, noise
traders who trade in the beginning subsidize both the informed traders and the
liquidity traders who trade later. The cost of a more informative price is borne by
noise traders who have to trade when the informed asymmetry is most severe.
Second, when there exists high frequency traders who can front-run others, the
market price is less informative because the informed trader trades less aggressively
and produces less information. In the continuous time limit, however, the negative
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effect of HFT front-running on price informativeness vanishes. The patient informed
trader perfectly smooths out his trading and HFTs effectively only front-run the
impatient noise traders who are unable to trade smoothly.
Hence, HFT front-running reduces market liquidity and tends to reduce infor-
mation efficiency. Such negative impact on price efficiency is mitigated when the
trading frequency is high.
Results of this paper suggest an additional benefit of trading smoothly. The
patient traders are less affected by short-horizon front-running HFTs. Impatient
noise traders are most susceptible to short-horizon front-running because they have
to trade quickly.
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Chapter A: Appendices to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs of Section 1.2
Section A.1.1 states a more general Theorem A.1.1 where the fast trader is risk
averse with an exponential utility functions − exp(−Aπ). Then, section A.1.2 proves
several necessary lemmas. Section A.1.3 proves the general theorem. Theorem 1.2.2
is a special case where the risk aversion coefficient is A = 0.
A.1.1 A generalized theorem
The equilibrium condition Equation (1.2.3) is generalized to allow risk aversion.
Definition A.1.1. Fast trader utility maximizing. Given the pricing function set
by market makers P (·), the informed trader’s strategy X(·), and a signal about the
incoming order flow Iy = x + z + ey the fast trader’s utility is maximized if she
trades u∗ shares at time 1− and −u∗ shares at time 1, i.e.,




U(πF ) |Iy, P (·), X(·)
]
(A.1.1)
where πF = u(p1 − p1−) and U(π) = − exp(−Aπ).
Theorem A.1.1 (Equilibrium when the fast trader is risk averse). Given
Assumption 1, there is a unique equilibrium where the four strategy functions X(·),
111
U(·), P (·), and Q(·) are
Informed trading size: x∗ = X(v; p0, λ
T ) = β (v − p0) (A.1.2)
Fast trading size: u∗ = U(Iy; p0, λ
T ) = αρIy (A.1.3)
Market order pricing: ptj = P (yj, ptj−1) = ptj−1 + λ
Tyj (A.1.4)
Final quote: p1+ = Q(u, y − u) = v0 + λPy (A.1.5)



























0 = (Aσvσz(1− ρ))2 (Θ + 1)2(Θ− 1) + Aσvσz(1− ρ)










(4 + ρ) (A.1.6)
Corollary A.1.2. If the fast trader is risk neutral (A = 0) the unique positive root
of Equation (A.1.6) is θ2 = Θ = 1−ρ/4
1+ρ/4
and we have Theorem 1.2.2.
Proof. The first two terms on the right hand side of the equation equal 0 if A = 0
or 1 − ρ = 0. Only the third term remains. Eliminate the case where Θ = 0 and




and it reduces to Theorem
1.2.2.
A.1.2 Strategies of each trader
Lemma A.1.3. Given the pricing function of Assumption 1, the fast trader’s optimal
trade size is u∗ = αŷ where α = 1
2+AλT (1−ρ)σ2y and her maximized expected profit at
112
time 1− is E
[
πF∗
∣∣λT , Iy] = α(1 − α)λT ŷ2 where ŷ = E[y|Iy] = ρIy. In particular,
when A = 0, the fast trader is risk neutral and α = 1
2
and E[πF∗] = 1
4
λT ŷ2.
Proof. market makers absorb residual order of size y − u at time 1. Given the
linear pricing function ptj = ptj−1 + λ
Tytj , the difference of between the fast trader’s
exit price and entry price is p1 − p1− = λT (y − u). The fast trader’s expected
profit is E[πF |p0, λT , Iy, u] = E
[
uλT (y − u)
∣∣ Iy, u] = uλT (ŷ − u) and its variance
Var[πF |p0, λT , Iy, u] = (uλT )2 Var[y − u|Iy, u] = (uλT )2(1 − ρ)σ2y. The fast trader
chooses u to maximize E[πF |p0, λT , Iy, u] − A2 Var[πF |p0, λT , Iy, u]. Solve the first
order condition to get u∗ = αŷ and πF∗ = α(1− α)λT ŷ2.
Remark A.1.1. The fast trader’s trading intensity α is independent from price impact
factor λT and information quality ρ only if she is risk neutral A = 0 or her information
is perfect ρ = 1.
Lemma A.1.4. Given Assumption 1, the informed trader’s optimal size of trade is
x∗ = 1
2λT
(v − p0) and her maximized expected profit at time 0+ is
E
[
πI∗ = x∗(v − p1)
∣∣ v, p0, λT ] = 1
4λT
(v − p0)2.
Proof. Given the pricing function ptj = ptj−1 + λ
Tytj , the informed trader estimates
that E[p1|v, p0, λT ] = p0 + λT E[x + z] = p0 + λTx Her expected profit is then
E[πI |v, p0, λT ] = x(v − p0 − λTx). Solve the first order condition to find x∗ and
πI∗.
Lemma A.1.5. Assuming that the informed trader choose x = β(v − p0) and the
fast trader chooses u = αŷ, the informationally efficient quotes p0 = E[v|F0] = v0








Proof. First, p0 equals the ex ante expected value v0. Second, the fast trader’s trade
size u = αŷ = αρIy = αρ(x+ z + ey). Given αρ, u is informationally equivalent to
sy = x+ z + ey, a noisy observation of y = x+ z. It has no extra information about
v when y = x + z is observed. Market makers can find x + z by summing up two
observed orders u and x+ z − u at time 1. From the projection theorem of normally
distributed random variables,









Cov [β(v − p0) + z, v]






Lemma A.1.6. Given Assumption 1 and the informed trader chooses x = β(v− p0)
and the fast trader chooses u = αŷ, market makers makes zero expected profit if they
set λT = λ
P
1−ρ(1−α)α , ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Follows from Lemma A.2.5 on Page 122
A.1.3 Proof of the generalized theorem of A.1.1
Lemma A.1.3,A.1.4, A.1.5, and A.1.6 imply that equilibrium strategies are all
linear given Assumption 1. And the four strategy functions are fully characterized by

















1− ρα(1− α) (A.1.7)
There are three exogenous parameters: volatility of the fundamental value of the
risky asset σv, volatility of noise trading σz, and the fast trader’s information quality
ρ as defined in Equation (1.2.1).
Define two unitless parameters as follows: θ := β σv
σz
and η := Aσvσz. θ is
endogenous and it measures the informed trader’s trading intensity. We will see that
η and ρ are the only relevant exogenous parameters in equilibrium and they are
also unitless. Changing the unit of v and z would have no effect on the exogenous
parameters η and ρ and the endogenous parameter θ.
















2 + (1− ρ)η θ2+1
2θ
The system of equations can be reduced to one equation of θ in terms of the exogenous
variable η = Aσvσz and ρ.




















Equation (A.1.9) is a sixth order polynomial equation of b:
0 = θ6η2(1− ρ)2 + 2θ5(4 + ρ)η(1− ρ) + θ4
(
η2(1− ρ)2 + 4(ρ+ 4)
)
+ 4θ3η(1− ρ)ρ− θ2
(
η2(1− ρ)2 − 4(ρ− 4)
)
+ 2θ(ρ− 4)η(1− ρ)
− η2(1− ρ)2 (A.1.10)
It can be reduced to a cubic equation of θ2. Let us define
U1 := η(1− ρ) ≥ 0, U2 :=
1− ρ/4
1 + ρ/4
∈ [0.6, 1] (A.1.11)
U1 and U2 are bounded since ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, Equation (A.1.10) can be rewritten
as a cubic equation of θ2
U21 (θ
2 + 1)2(1− θ2) = U1(θ2 + 1)(θ2 − U2)(4 + ρ) + 4θ2(θ2 − U2)(4 + ρ) (A.1.12)
We can express θ2 in closed-form as a function of ρ and η. The following Lemma
suffice to conclude the proof of Theorem A.1.1.
Lemma A.1.7. For η ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ [0, 1], the cubic equation (A.1.12) has an unique
real root of θ2 in the range [U2, 1].
Proof. For η ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ [0, 1], U1 = η(1 − ρ) ≥ 0 and U2 ∈ [0.6, 1]. Define
Θ = θ2 > 0. Let g(Θ) denote the right hand side of Equation (A.1.12), i.e.,
g(Θ) = U21 (Θ + 1)
2(Θ− 1) + U1(Θ + 1)(Θ− U2)(4 + ρ) + 4Θ(Θ− U2)(4 + ρ)
1. g(Θ) < 0 if 0 < Θ < U2 ≤ 1 because the first and the second term of g(Θ) are
weakly negative and the third term is strictly negative.
2. g(Θ) > 0 if Θ > 1 ≥ U1 because the first two terms of g(Θ) are weakly positive
and the third term is strictly positive.
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1 (U2 + 1)
2(U2 − 1) ≤ 0, g(1) = 2(U1 + 2)(1− U2)(4 + ρ) ≥ 0
4. The root in [U2, 1] is unique because g(Θ) is increasing in [U2, 1]. The second
and third terms of g(Θ) are increasing in Θ. The first term is also increasing





(Θ + 1)2(Θ− 1) = 3Θ2 + 2Θ− 1 > 0 if Θ > 1
3
(A.1.13)
Since Θ ≥ U2 ≥ 0.6, all three terms of g(Θ) are increasing for Θ ∈ [U2, 1].
Therefore, there is a unique real Θ ∈ [U2, 1] that satisfies g(Θ) = 0.
Corollary A.1.8. If A = 0 or ρ = 1, U1 = 0 and Θ = U2 is the unique positive root.
If ρ = 0, U2 = 1 and Θ = 1 is the unique positive root.
A.1.4 Equilibrium impact of fast trader’s risk aversion
As illustrated in Figure A.1, risk aversion mitigates the impact of the fast
trader on equilibrium when her information is noisy ρ < 1. The fast trader’s trading
intensity α is now increasing with her information quality ρ and decreasing with her
risk exposure Aσvσz.
As the fast trader becomes more risk averse (A ↑), the fast trader reduces
trading intensity (α ↓), market makers amplify temporary price impact less λT
λP
↓,
and the informed trader increases trading intensity (β ↑).
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increases with η = Aσvσz and decreases with ρ.
Particularly, as η → 0 or ρ→ 1, U1 → 0 and θ2 → U2 = 0.6; as η →∞ or ρ→ 0,
θ2 → U2 = 1.
Proof. Omitted. It can be derived from the closed-form representation of θ2 as a
root of the cubic equation or the implicit function theorem.
Proposition A.1.9 shows that when A > 0, limη→∞ θ = 1. When the fast trader
is risk neutral (A = 0), θ is unaffected by σvσz. This highlights the importance of
risk aversion especially when risk exposure Aσvσz is high. When the fast trader is
risk averse, her impact becomes less important as her risk exposure Aσvσz →∞.
For example, Proposition 1.5.3 implies that the ratio of the fast trader’s







that the fast trader’s information is noisy (ρ < 1). Then,

















1− ρ/4 > 0 (A.1.15)
Keeping the fast trader’s risk aversion A > 0 fixed and ρ < 1, the fast trader’s
expected profit E[πF ] still increases with σvσz but increases slower than E[π
I ]. In the
limit when σvσz →∞, the fast trader’s profit is negligible compared to the informed
trader’s profit.
Intuitively, the fast trader is more risk averse than the informed trader. As
σvσz increases, the risk exposure is higher. The fast trader reduces trading intensity
more than the informed trader. In the limit, σvσz →∞, the fast trader stop trading
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(a) Equilibrium fast trading intensity α















(b) Equilibrium informed trading intensity β/σzσv





















λq, (Aσvσz = 25)
λq , when Aσvσz = 0
Fast trader’s information quality ρ
(c) Price impact in unit of σvσz

















Fast trader’s information quality ρ
(d) Price impact amplifier λλq
Figure A.1: Equilibrium of model with a risk averse fast trader. A is the fast
trader’s risk aversion. ρ is the fast trader’s information quality. Aσvσz measures the
fast trader’s risk exposure. ρ and Aσvσz are both unitless.
(a) Fast trading intensity α increases with her information quality ρ and decreases
with the risk exposure Aσvσz. (b) Normalized informed trading intensity β · σvσz
decreases with the fast trader’s information quality ρ and increases with risk exposure
Aσvσz. (c) Normalized temporary price impact per share λ
T increases with the fast
trader’s information quality ρ and decreases withe Aσvσz. Normalized permanent
price impact per share λP decreases with ρ and increases with Aσvσz. (d) Temporary
price impact amplifier λ
T
λP
measures the extra friction caused by the fast trader. It
increases with ρ and decreases with Aσvσz.
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due to high risks and all profits go to the informed trader.
A.2 Proofs of Section 1.3
A.2.1 Trader strategies with multiple fast traders
Lemma A.2.1 (Prices). The order flow is {u1, · · · , uJ , y − SJ}. The linear pricing
function specified in Assumption 1 implies that the traded prices are
ptj = ptj−1 + λ
Tuj = p0 + λ
TSj, j = 1, 2, · · · J (A.2.1)
p1 = ptJ + λ
T (y − SJ) = p0 + λTy (A.2.2)
By equilibrium condition, market makers set initial and final quotes to their condi-
tional expectation of v.
p0 = E[v] = v0, p1+ = E [v|F1] = E [v |u1, u2, · · · , uJ , y − SJ ] (A.2.3)
where Ft denotes the information of market makers at time t.
Lemma A.2.2 (Each fast trader’s order size). Given all others’ strategy β, λT , λP ,∑
j,l 6=k uj,l, the last traded price ptj−1, and the signal Iy, fast trader (j, k)’s optimal









Proof. Fast trader (j, k)’s expected profit after submitting uj,k is






































Lemma A.2.3 (Fast trading size in symmetric equilibrium). In the symmetric





























(ŷ − Sy−1) (A.2.5)
The last step uses the symmetry.
Lemma A.2.4 (Fast trading size uj and Sj). Assume that the aggregate fast trading















Proof. Proof by induction. S0 = u0 = α0 = 0 by definition. u1 = α1(ŷ − S0) = α1ŷ
and S1 = u0 + u1 = u1 = α1ŷ (1− (1− α1)(1− α0)). Suppose the Lemma holds for
j ≤ K. Then,















SK+1 = uK+1 + SK = αK+1(ŷ − SK) + SK
= αK+1ŷ + (1− αK+1)SK





















Lemma A.2.5 (Equation of λT and λP ). Given Assumption 1 and assume that the
aggregate fast trading at time tj is uj = αj (ŷ − Sj−1), the following equation must
hold if market makers make 0 expected profit at time 0:















The final quote is p1+ = p0 + λ
Py. At time 1, market makers absorb the residual



















(λT − λP )y
]
= σ2y(λ









market makers expect to lose by trading with fast traders at each time tj. Their
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The last step uses Lemma A.2.4. The 0 profit condition requires that the market
makers’ total expected loss equal their expected profit. Hence,
σ2y(λ






































, α0 = 0
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Lemma A.2.6. Suppose all fast traders choose uj,k = αj,k (ŷ − Sj−1) and the in-
formed trader chooses x = β(v−p0). The final quote is p1+ = E[v|FV1 ] = v0+λP (x+z)







Proof. The aggregate order flow over the entire trading round equals y = SJ + x+
z−SJ = x+ z. Fast traders choose uj,k based on ŷ = ρIy. Because Iy = x+ z+ ey is
a noisy observation of x+ z, observing uj has no additional information about v once






based on the projection
theorem for normal random variables.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1.3.1
Proof. Lemma A.1.4, A.2.3, A.2.5 and A.2.6 imply that equilibrium strategies are




(ŷ − Sj−1) , ∀j, k






















, α0 = 0
Define θ := β σv
σz








































A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 1.4.1
The (j, k)-th fast trader chooses uj,k =
αj
nj
(ŷ − Sj−1). Her execution price is
ptj = p0 + λ
TSj and she expects p1 = p0 + λ
Ty. Plus, Lemma A.2.4 implies that










(ŷ − Sj−1) E [y − Sj|Iy] = λT
αj
nj














































































A.3 Proofs of Section 1.4
A.3.1 Basic properties of speed friction γ
Proposition A.3.1. 0 ≤ γ < 1 for J > 0.









can prove by induction that γ(J) < 1−∏Ji=0(1− αi)2.
1. γ(1) = (1− α1)− (1− α1)2 < 1− (1− α1)2.
2. Assume γ(k − 1) < 1−∏k−1i=0 (1− αi)2 for k − 1 ≥ 1. Then,











< 1− (1− αk)2
k−1∏
i=0




3. Therefore, γ(J) < 1−∏Ji=0(1− αj)2 < 1 for all J ≥ 1.
Lemma A.3.2. ∂γ
∂αk
< 0 if αk ≥ 12 .






















Since αi < 1 for all i ≤ k − 1,
∏k−1
i=0 (1− αi)2 > 0. ∂γ∂αk < 0 ⇐⇒
∂
∂αk
αk(1− αk) + (1− αk)2








(1− 2αk)− 2(1− αk)







⇐⇒ 1− 2αk < 2(1− αk)







Since αk ≥ 12 , the left hand side of Eq. (A.3.1) 1− 2αk ≤ 0. The right hand side of




Lemma A.3.3. Consolidating the last two groups of fast traders reduces speed
friction, i.e.., γ{··· ,m+n} < γ{··· ,m,n}.
Proof. First, γ{··· ,m+n} < γ{··· ,m} because entry of n fast traders at the same time as
the m fast traders reduces speed friction when m > 0; second, γ{··· ,m} = γ{··· ,m,∞}
because infinite number of fast traders at the end are perfectly competitive and act
like the competitive market makers; third, γ{··· ,m,∞} < γ{··· ,m,n} because reducing
the number of fast traders at time tJ increases speed friction. In sum, γ{··· ,m+n} <
γ{··· ,m} < γ{··· ,m,∞} < γ{··· ,m,n} and it follows that γ{··· ,m+n} < γ{··· ,m,n}.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 1.4.6












= αj. Lemma A.3.2 then implies that γ decreases.
Then I prove entry of one fast trader with a different speed from existing risk
neutral fast traders increases speed friction γ. Suppose that there are J instants that
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the fast traders can trade. Compare the following two speed profiles of fast traders:
Speed profile 1: {n1, n2, · · · , 0, nk+1, · · · , nJ} ,
Speed profile 2: {n1, n2, · · · , 1, nk+1, · · · , nJ}
for 1 ≤ k ≤ J . Speed profile 2 is obtained if 1 fast trader enter at time tk. The
aggregate trading intensities of the two speed profiles are:
profile 1: {α1, α2, · · · , 0, αk+1, · · · , αJ}
and profile 2: {α1, α2, · · · , αk, αk+1, · · · , αJ}














































































Hence, the difference in speed frictions between the two profiles are:
























(1− αk)− (2− αk)








Since αk ∈ (0, 1), αk
∏k−1
i=0 (1− αi)2 > 0 . Hence, γ2 > γ1 ⇐⇒
1− αk
2− αk










Because αj ∈ [0, 1), αj(1− αj) ≤ 14 . Thus,


















































Because only one fast trader enters at time tk, αk ∈ (0, 12 ]. LHS of Eq. (A.3.2) is
decreasing in αk. It follows that
1−αk
2−αk ∈ [1/3, 1/2]. Therefore,





> RHS of Eq. (A.3.2) ⇐⇒ γ2 > γ1




entry always increases speed friction. γ.
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A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 1.4.5
1. Suppose there are J time instants with positive number of fast traders. nj ≥ 1,
hence αj ≥ 12 for all ∀1 ≤ j ≤ J a since all fast traders are risk neutral. Lemma
A.3.2 shows that ∂γ
∂αj































































2. Starting from the speed profile {n1, n2, · · · , nJ}, we can obtain the speed profile{∑J
i=1 ni
}
by recursively consolidating the last two groups as follows:
{n1, · · · , nJ−1, nJ} → {n1, · · · , nJ−2, nJ−1 + nJ}
→
{


















Lemma A.3.3 implies that speed friction is reduced after each consolidation







friction than any starting profile.
A.3.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4.7
I prove sufficiency and necessity respectively.
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1. Prove ⇒. Assume limN→∞ γ = 0. By definition γ ≥ α1(1− α1) = n1(1+n1)2 . It




We can then prove by contradiction that limN→∞ n1 =∞.

























2 < 1 due to Proposition A.3.1. Hence, limN→ γ = 0.
A.4 Proofs of Section 1.5
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1.5.1
Proof. At time t1, order flow u1 reveals fast traders’ information Iy perfectly.



































Ex post, information is revealed through the order flow y = x+ z = β(v − v0) + z.
The projection theorem of normal random variables implies that Var[v|F1+ ] =












. Plug in the equilibrium θ and we find







A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 1.5.3









Fast traders’ total profit is given in Proposition 1.4.1. The informed trading profit













A.5 Proof of Proposition 1.6.1
Proof. Suppose trader 1 chooses order size u1. In a symmetric equilibrium, all others
have the same probability being placed at each position in the queue and each of
them chooses to trade u. Conditional on ŷ and others’ choice of u, trader 1 has an
equal probability of being at each position. Her expected profit is
E [u1(p1 − pu1)|ŷ] =
λT
N
(u1(ŷ − u1) + u1(ŷ − u− u1) + · · ·+ u1(ŷ − (N − 1)u− u1))
= λT
(





Alternatively, pu1 = p0 +λ
Tu1 +λ
Tku where k is the number of fast traders executed
before trader 1 after the shuffling. k has equal probability of being 0, 1, · · · , N − 1.
Hence, E[pu1|u1] = p0 + λTu1 + λT (N − 1)u/2. The first order condition implies that
u∗1 = (ŷ−(N−1)u/2)/2. Due to symmetry, u∗1 = u and we have that u∗ = 2ŷ/(N+3).
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The aggregate profit of fast traders conditional on Iy is
N∑
i=1
u∗λT (ŷ − iu∗) = λT ŷ
(




Nu∗ = λT ŷ
(









Therefore, the effective speed friction is γ = 4N
(N+3)2
. If γ = 1, γ = 1/4 and if γ = 2,
γ = 8/25.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1.7.1
Proof. Lemma A.2.4 implies that the total fast traders’ order flow SJ satisfies



























Because SJ is normally distributed, trading volume |SJ | follows a half-normal distri-
bution.



















The informed and noise traders order flow is y = x+z. y is normally distributed with












1 + θ2σz (A.6.2)
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A.7 Fast traders collusion
HFTs are unlikely to collude because trading is anonymous. Nevertheless, the
collusion equilibrium could be relevant because it is the upper bound of fast traders’
profit. If fast traders with the same speed collude, in aggregate they would act like
a monopoly as in the benchmark model and γ = 1/4. If fast traders with different
speeds collude, they would make speed friction γ even higher than the Stackelberg
case.
Proposition A.7.1 (Fast traders’ collusion). Suppose J fast traders collude and
trade at different time instants. Then,
Fast trader j trades: uj =
ŷ
J + 1
= αj (ŷ − Sj−1) , where αj =
1
J − j + 2





friction γ = J
2(J+1)

























uj(ŷ − Sj−1 − uj) (A.7.2)














First order conditions imply that ∀j, uj = 12
(
ŷ −∑i 6=j ui). It follows that ∑i ui =
1
2


























Fast traders’ trade sizes are the same as in the Cournot competition. The difference
is that they submit the orders sequentially and march up the supply curve gradually.
We can easily verify that the strategy is equivalent to choosing αj =
1
J−j+2 . Hence,














J − j + 1
(J − j + 2)2












The collusive speed friction γ = J
2(J+1)






and limJ→∞ γ = 1/2 as illustrated in Figure A.2.
Remark A.7.1. Each of the colluding fast trader trades 1
1+J
of the total estimated
order ŷ. Side payments from the slower traders to the faster ones are necessary to
sustain the collusion because faster front-runners make less profits in trading when
they collude with slower front-runners.
Remark A.7.2. J colluding fast traders with the same speed can at best mimic a
monopoly fast trader, i.e., γ = 1/4. Allowing colluding fast traders to have different
speeds resulting in a much higher speed friction.
Remark A.7.3. Interpreting the result differently, J colluding fast traders with
different speeds is equivalent to a monopolistic fast trader who can trade J times
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in a trading round. If all fast traders can trade multiple times in a trading round,
the resulting speed friction curve would lie between the collusive curve and the
competition curve under different speeds in Figure A.2. Competition from slower
fast traders improves market quality. Even when fast traders collude, the market
quality would be much better if all fast traders have the same speed. The key result
of this paper still holds: higher trading frequency (or finer time granularity) allows
front-runners to extract more trading profits. Lowering the frequency of periodic
uniform price auction can improve market quality because it limits the number of






Collusion under the same speed
Competition under the same speed
Competition under different speeds







Number of fast traders
Speed friction γ
Figure A.2: Speed differences and competitions among fast traders
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Chapter B: Appendices to Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2.2.1
The value function for the informed is















where T is the random news announcement time. If the news has not been announced
by time t, its probability of being announced in the [t, t+ dt) interval is e−ηdt. Thus,
we can write
V (t) = max
βt
{
EIt (v − pt)βtdt+ e−ηdt EIt V (t+ dt)
}
(B.1.2)
The Bellman’s equation is
0 = max
{




dDt = Dt+ −Dt = pt − pt− = −dpt = −λt(βtdt+ dzt) (B.1.4)
Hence,
EIt [dDt] = E
I
t [−dpt] = −λtβtdt (B.1.5)
dDtdDt = dptdpt = λ
2







































































Because it’s linear in βt, the maximal exists and equals 0 only if




























Hence, equation (B.1.9) implies that
∂V
∂t
= ηV − λt
2
σ2z (B.1.11)





























Hence, we can find λt as follows
dλt
dt
= −ηλt ⇒ λt = λ0e−ηt (B.1.15)
Market makers must set an exponentially decaying price impact λt such that the
informed trader’s value function exists.
Then, we can find the value function in terms of λt. From equation (B.1.13),
value function must have the form:






















⇒ g′(D) = D
λ0
(B.1.20)




where C is a constant. Hence,






















V (t, 0) is the continuation value when pt = E
t
I v. It is generally not 0 because noise
trading would push the price away from the correct value. If the news is going to be
announced very soon, the continuation value must converge to 0.
0 = lim
η→∞
V (t, 0) = lim
η→∞
Ceηt ⇒ C = 0 (B.1.23)















We can find λ0 from the 0 expected profit of the market makers. The expected loss
of the noise trader is
EMt [dptdzt] = E
M
t [λt(dxt + dzt)dzt] = λtσ
2
zdt (B.1.25)


















































The expected gain for the informed trader at time 0 is























































Hence, for the market makers, the expected informed profit is





Next, let’s find the residual information asymmetry Σt = Var
M
t [v̂]. Due to
orthogonality and equation (B.1.15),















Plug in λ0 found in Equation (B.1.28),





















1 Note here the zero profit condition is imposed on the [0,T] interval. The condition cannot be
imposed for each dt interval because the informed trader’s strategy is indeterminate. There are
multiple βt strategies that would reach the value function.
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Finally, let’s find the informed trader’s trading intensity βt. Note that the
informed trader have multiple optimal strategy as in Kyle (1985) and Back (1992).
We look for the equilibrium where the market maker’s price updating rule is correct
at each instant. The candidate strategy has the form
dxt = βtdt = β̄t(v̂ − pt)dt
where β̂t := βt/(v̂ − pt). Then, the order flow
dyt = dxt + dzt = β̄tDtdt+ σzdBt
Since Dt = v̂ − pt = v̂ − EMt [v̂], we have that















EMt [v̂] = 0 · pt = 0 (B.1.36)
Using the standard filtering theorem (see Back (2004) for an introduction),





















































In sum, the equilibrium is





e−ηt(dxt + dzt) (B.1.40)









eηt(v̂ − pt)dt (B.1.41)





















B.2 Proof of Theorem 2.2.5






v n = 0










(1− β∆t)n/2λ0 n ≥ 1
(B.2.2)
Σn decays as fast as λ
2






= 1− β∆t ∈ [0, 1], n ≥ 1 (B.2.3)
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pn = E [v̂ |pn−1,∆yn = ∆xn + ∆zn ] (B.2.5)
= pn−1 + E[v̂ − pn−1|∆yn = ∆xn + ∆zn, pn−1] (B.2.6)
= pn−1 + E
[
Dn






















Solve for λ2n and we have
λ2nσ
2
z∆t = β∆t(1− β∆t)Σn−1 (B.2.10)
Because σ2z and β∆t(1− β∆t) are time invariant, Σn is decreases at the same rate
as λ2n.
In addition, ∆pn is orthogonal to pn−1. Due to normality,











= 1− β∆t (B.2.13)
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Equation (2.2.13) that v̂ = ρiS. Hence,
Σ0 = Var
M
0 [v̂] = Var
M































λn = λ0(1− β∆t)n/2, n ≥ 1 (B.2.19)
Informed trader’s expected profit from trading starting at time n is





















Dn∆xn − λn(∆xn)2 + e−η∆t EIn[V (n+ 1, Dn − λn(∆xn + ∆zn)]
}
The first order condition is






and the Envelope theorem implies that
∂V
∂Dn








Together, it follows that













Given the conjectured form ∆xn = β
Dn
λn



























− e−η∆t(1− β∆t) EIn
[


















1− β∆t. Therefore, the equilibrium





⇒ e−η∆t = 1− 2β∆t
(1− β∆t)3/2
(B.2.25)
As illustrated in Figure B.3, β∆t is a concave and increasing function of η∆t. It can
be easily proved using calculus.
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Next, we need to find the second term of the value function f(n). When
Dn = 0, the informed trading at this instant ∆xn = 0 and Dn+1 = −λn∆zn. In

























Multiply both side by e−(n+1)η∆t and rearrange the terms.
















































































= f(0)(1− β∆t)k/2 (B.2.29)
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Therefore,







B.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2.6
Define B = β∆t ∈ [0, 1/2] and G = 1 − e−η∆t ∈ [0, 1]. We know from
Theorem 2.2.5 that
1− 2B



































Hence, lim∆t→0 β = 2η. Rest of the proof follows.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.2.7
The probability of public news announcement in the next ∆t interval equals
1− e−η∆t . The function g(·) is implicitly defined by the equantion
1− 2β∆t
(1− β∆t)3/2
= 1− (1− e−η∆t) (B.4.1)
such that β∆t = g(1 − e−η∆t). It is easy to show that g′(x) > 0 and g′′(x) < 0
for x ∈ [0, 1] with calculus. Figure B.1 illustrates function g(·), which reflects the
relationship between the trading intensity β∆t and probability of news announcement
in the next ∆t interval 1− e−η∆t . As η∆t →∞, it’s almost for sure the news is going
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to be announced before the next period. The trading game reduces to the one period
game of Kyle (1985) where the informed trader trade away half of the information
(β∆t = 1/2) in one trade. When η∆t → 0, the probability of news announcement is
minimal and the informed trade very patiently (β∆t → 0).
Figure B.1: β∆t = g(1− e−η∆t) where g(·) > 0 and g′′(·) < 0.
In addition, ∂
∂η
(1 − e−η∆t) = e−η∆t∆t > 0 and ∂∂∆t (1 − e
−η∆t) = e−η∆tη > 0.
Hence, β∆t increases with η or ∆t. Intuitively, when η or ∆t is higher, it’s more
likely that the public news arrives before the next trading opportunity. Thus, the
informed trades away more information when he still has the information advantage.
We also needs to find how public information arrival rate η and trading frequency
1
∆t
affect β. Figure B.3 illustrates the effects.
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Figure B.2: β∆t increases with public information arrival rate η and time duration
between trades ∆t.






= g′(1− e−η∆t)e−η∆t > 0 (B.4.2)
Second, β is higher when the trading frequency 1
∆t
is higher. Let G = 1 − e−η∆t .












It’s easy to show with Taylor expansion that eη∆t − 1 > η∆t. It follows that
e−η∆tη∆t < e
−η∆t(eη∆t − 1) < 1− e−η∆t (B.4.4)
Moreover, applying mean value theorem to g(x) and use the concavity that g′′(·) < 0,
we have that there exists for κ ∈ [0, 1] such that
0 = g(0) = g(x)− xg′(x) + 1
2
(x)2g′′(κx) < g(x)− xg′(x) (B.4.5)








(g′(G)G− g(G)) < 0 (B.4.7)
Figure B.3: β = g(1− exp(−η∆t))/∆t increases with η and decreases with ∆t.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 2.2.9
(*) It’s obvious that T λ(∆t) = 2T




















It’s easy to check that log(1− β∆t) + β∆t1−β∆t is increasing in β∆t when β∆t ≥ 0 and
log(1 − β∆t) + β∆t1−β∆t = 0 when β∆t = 0. In addition, Proposition 2.2.7 implies
that ∂β
∂∆t
> 0. Hence, when β∆t ≥ 0,
(










The continuous limit T λ and TΣ can be found immediately from 2.2.6 because
lim∆t→0(1− β∆t) = 2η. This result is illustrated in Figure B.4. The TΣ(∆t) curve
illustrates that the information efficiency of the trading game monotonically increases
with trading frequency. As ∆t goes from 1 to 0.01, the half life of Σt goes down from
about 2.7 to about 1.7. Half of the private information is revealed to the market
in 1.7 unit of time in the continuous time limit. Check Figure 2.4 for a different
presentation of the result. The T λ(∆t) curve illustrates that the illiquidity factor λt
decays twice as fast as Σt. As ∆t goes down, λt also decays faster.
Figure B.4: Half life of information asymmetry TΣ and price impact T λ for different
∆t when public information arrival rate η = 0.2 and E[T ] = 1/η = 5.
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B.6 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
Assume the market makers set the end of period price at pn = pn−1 +λn(∆xn +
∆zn) but the liquidity demanders get the prices p
′
n = pn−1 + (1 + ξ)λn(∆xn + ∆zn)
where ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
Informed trader’s expected profit from trading starting at time n is














The Bellman’s equation of this dynamic programming problem is
V (n,Dn) = max
∆xn
{
EIn[∆xn(v̂ − pn−1 − (1 + ξ)λn∆xn − (1 + ξ)λn∆zn)]





Dn∆xn − (1 + ξ)λn(∆xn)2
+ e−η∆t EIn[V (n+ 1, Dn − λn(∆xn + ∆zn))]
}
(B.6.1)
The first order condition is






and the Envelope theorem implies that
∂V
∂Dn







Then, it follows that


















Given the conjectured form ∆xn = β̂
Dn
λn
∆t. We can write that
∂V
∂Dn

































⇒ (1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t)
Dn
λn







e−η∆t(1− β̂∆t)(1− (1 + 2ξ)β̂∆t)
1− 2β̂(1 + ξ)∆t
(B.6.11)






e−η∆t(1− β̂∆t)(1− β̂(1 + 2ξ)∆t)
1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t
(B.6.12)
⇒ e−η∆t = 1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t√
1− β̂∆t(1− (1 + 2ξ) · β̂∆t)
(B.6.13)
Then, β̂∆t ≤ 12(1+ξ) to ensure that the RHS is not negative. β̂∆t is a concave
and increasing function of η∆t as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Following the similar

























To fully determine the value function, we need to find f(n) in Equation (B.6.7).
When Dn = 0, ∆xn = 0. Thus,
f(n) = V (n, 0) = e−η∆t EIn[V (n+ 1,−λn∆zn)]
= e−η∆t EIn
[
























Multiply both sides by e−nη∆t , we have that
e−(n+1)η∆tf(n+ 1) = e−nη∆tf(n) + e−(n+1)η∆t







z∆t(1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t)n+1
2(1− β̂∆t)(1− (1 + 2ξ) · β̂∆t)n
(B.6.19)
Take the summation over n from 0 to k − 1. Then,









1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t






1− (1 + 2ξ) · β̂∆t
1− β̂∆t
(
1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t
















1− (1 + 2ξ) · β̂∆t
1− β̂∆t
(




1−( 1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t
1− (1 + 2ξ) · β̂∆t
)k (B.6.20)






1− (1 + 2ξ) · β̂∆t
1− β̂∆t
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1− (1 + 2ξ)β̂∆t
1− β̂∆t
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1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t







Therefore, the value function is
V (n,Dn)












1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t
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1− (1 + 2ξ)β̂∆t
1− β̂∆t
(
1− 2(1 + ξ)β̂∆t
)













B.7 Proof of Proposition 2.3.4
We can prove that lim∆t→0 β̂ = 2η using the similar derivations as in Appendix
B.3. Let G = 1− e−η∆t and B̂ = β̂∆t. Then,
1−G = 1− 2(1 + ξ)B̂√












1− 1− 2(1 + ξ)B̂√







2(1 + ξ)B̂ − 1√














(1− (1 + 2ξ)B̂)−
√






































(1− (1 + 2ξ)B̂)2
= lim
B̂→0


























Therefore, lim∆t→0 β̂ = 2η. Then, it is trivial to show that as ∆t → 0, β̂ → 2η and














In this section, I find the optimal level of information production. The informed
trader has to decide on the amount of information production ρi before the trading
game starts. Thus, at the information production stage, he chooses a ρi to maximize
the expected trading profit V (0, D).
B.8.1 Informed trader’s profits
The informed trader extract “information rent” by trading on his private
information. The magnitude of the information rent is affected by the parameters of
the trading game.
Note that β is determined by η and ∆t and it does not depend on ρi. This does
not mean the informed trader does not care about ρi. Even though the informed
trader is risk neutral, the level of information production would change λ0 through
the market makers and thus change the expected trading profit.
Proposition B.8.1. The expected trading profit at time 0 as









where β = g(1 − e−η∆t)/∆t is the unique solution to equation (2.2.41) such that




















From Theorem 2.2.1, in the continuous time equilibrium,
















From Theorem 2.2.5, in the discrete time equilibrium,


























































So U becomes linear in ∆t with a slope of −3/2.
Corollary B.8.2. The informed trader’s profit is increasing in the total fundamental
uncertainty σv, the amount of his private information ρi, and noise trading σz.
Proof. From Theorem 2.2.5, β is determined by η and ∆t. Then, the corollary
immediately follows from Proposition B.8.1.
The initial information asymmetry Var[v̂] = ρiσ
2
v captures the information
advantage of the informed trader and the volatility σz captures the volume of noise
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trading. The informed expects to make more profits when he has higher information
advantage or there is more noise trading volume.
In addition to the above factors, the informed trader’s profits are also affected
by the expected lifetime of his private information 1/η and the frequency of the
trading game 1/∆t.
Proposition B.8.3. The informed trader’s expected trading profit increases the
expected lifetime of the private information 1/η, i.e., ∂U
∂η
< 0. In the continuous time








When probability of public news is low (η∆t  1), informed trader’s expected trading
profit increases with trading frequency (1/∆t).
2
Proof. * Follows from Proposition 2.2.7 and Proposition B.8.1.
Given the same degree of information advantage ρiσ
2
v and level of noise trading
σz, the informed expects to make more profits when his private information has
a longer lifetime or when the trading frequency is higher. Figure B.5 illustrates
2 A definitive bound is yet to be found. Informed trader’s profit could increase with ∆t when
η∆t is large. This result is due to the assumption that the first trade occurs at ∆t and the amount
of noise trading at the first trading opportunity is σz∆t, which increases with ∆t. For example,
suppose η∆t  10 and the probability of trade is close to 0. The benefit of smoothing out trade
becomes negligible because the probability of trading more than once is extremely low. Then the
informed chooses β∆t ≈ 1/2 and his expected profits is proportional to 1/
√
β, which increases with
∆t and is mainly driven by the level of noise trading σz∆t. Intuitively, when ∆t → 0, β → 2η and
the informed trader’s profit is approximately proportional to 1− 322η∆t, which increases with 1/∆t.
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U(η,∆t) as a function of η and ∆t. Informed trader’s profits are more sensitive to η
than to ∆t.
Figure B.5: Expected informed trading profit U = E[V (0, D0)] decreases with public
information arrival speed η and time duration between trades ∆t.
It shows that as everyone trades at a higher frequency, the ex ante expected
trading profit for informed trader is higher, despite that his private information gets
incorporated faster into the price and despite the higher initial market illiquidity.
Informed trader’s expected trading profit increases with the expected lifetime
of the private information E[T ] = 1/η. It seems to suggest that the informed trader
would achieve infinite expected trading profit if he could produce private information
that would never be revealed (E[T ] → ∞). This unrealistic result is due to the
assumption of zero discount rate. If the informed trader has a positive time discount
rate, he would prefer to produce information that would be realized sooner than
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later so that his trading profit is discounted less. In fact, once the time discount
is positive, the informed trader would prefer a private information whose speed of
expiration matches his discount rate. A more patient trader would choose to produce
longer lived information.
B.8.2 Optimal information production
Next, let’s investigate the optimal level of information production ρi. To explore
the effects of trading frequency 1/∆t, we need to specify the information production
cost function C(ρi, ω).
Definition B.8.1. Aggregate expected profit combining the information production
stage and the trading stage is defined
V(ρi, η,∆t, ω) = U(ρi, η,∆t)− C(ρi, ω), ρi ∈ [0, 1] (B.8.8)
for the discrete time model and
V(ρi, η, ω) = U(ρi, η)− C(ρi, ω), ρi ∈ [0, 1] (B.8.9)
for the continuous time model.
Definition B.8.2 (Information production equilibrium). Equilibrium Information
production ρi of the discrete time model satisfies
V(ρi, η,∆t, ω) ≥ V(ρ′i, η,∆t, ω) ∀ρ′i ∈ [0, 1] (B.8.10)
The equilibrium ρi is a function of ζ,∆t, and ω. For the continuous time model, ρi
satisfies
V(ρi, η, ω) ≥ V(ρ′i, η, ω) ∀ρ′i ∈ [0, 1] (B.8.11)
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for the continuous time model. In addition, β is determined by η and ∆t and not
affected by ρi.
Assume that C(ρi, ω) is twice differentiable for ρi ∈ (0, 1) and for a parameter











, and the marginal trading profit U1 = ∂U∂√ρi .
Theorem B.8.4 (Equilibrium Information production ρi). The equilibrium ρ
∗
i might
be one of the following cases:
1. If limρi→0+C1(ρi, ω) ≥ U1(ρi, η,∆t) and C2(ρi, ω) ≥ 0, ρ∗i = 0. It’s optimal not
to produce any information because the marginal cost of information is always
higher than the marginal expected trading profit.
2. If limρi→1−C1(ρi, ω) ≤ U1(ρi, ζ,∆t) and C2(ρi, ω) ≥ 0, ρ∗i = 1. It’s optimal
to produce all information because the marginal cost of information is always
lower than the marginal expected trading profit.
3. If limρi→0+C1(ρi, ω) ≤ U1(ρi, ζ,∆t) ≤ limρi→1−C1(ρi, ω) and C2(ρi, ω) ≥ 0,
there exists an unique interior level of information production ρ∗i ∈ (0, 1).
4. If C2(ρi, ω) < 0 for some ρi, there might exists multiple equivalent level of
optimal ρ∗i in [0, 1].
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The continuous time result is similar.
Proof. It follows directly from the first order and second order condition of V(ρi, η,∆t, ω).
Corollary B.8.5. Assume C2(ρi, ω) ≥ 0, C1(0, ω) = 0 and C1(1, ω) = ∞. Under
these assumptions, equilibrium information production ρ∗i ∈ (0, 1) is unique. Then,
1. If the noise trading does not affect the marginal cost of information production
( ∂C1
∂σz





2. If the total uncertain about v does not affect the marginal cost of information
production ( ∂C1
∂σv
= 0), the informed trader produces more information when




3. If information production becomes cheaper without affecting trading frequency
1/∆t and public information arrival rate ζ, then the informed trader produces
more information.
4. If trading frequency 1/∆t does not affect the marginal cost of information
production ∂C1
∂∆t





5. If public information arrival rate η does not affect the marginal cost of informa-
tion production (∂C1
∂η
= 0), then the informed trader produces more information







Proof. The first three cases are straightforward. The fourth and fifth cases follow
from Lemma B.8.3 noticing that ∂
2U
∂ρi∂∆t






same sign as ∂U
∂η
.
Higher frequency induces the informed trader to produce more private infor-
mation and especially short-lived information. When trading frequency is high,
the informed would have more trading opportunity to exploit a short-lived private
information.
For a given public information arrival rate η, a higher trading frequency ( 1
∆t
↑)
induces the informed trader to produce more information (ρi ↑) and to trade more
aggressively (β ↓). Thus, more fundamental information is produced and such
information is revealed to the market through trading faster. The informativeness of
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